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ABSTRACT 
 
The dissertation concentrates on addressing the factors and capabilities that enable insiders to 
violate systems security. It focuses on modeling the accumulative knowledge that insiders get 
throughout legal accesses, and it concentrates on analyzing the dependencies and constraints 
among data items and represents them using graph-based methods.  The dissertation proposes 
new types of Knowledge Graphs (KGs) to represent insiders’ knowledgebases. Furthermore, it 
introduces the Neural Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG) and Constraints and 
Dependencies Graph (CDG) to demonstrate the dependencies and constraints among data items. 
The dissertation discusses in detail how insiders use knowledgebases and dependencies and 
constraints to get unauthorized knowledge. It suggests new approaches to predict and prevent the 
aforementioned threat. The proposed models use KGs, NDIG and CDG in analyzing the threat 
status, and leverage the effect of updates on the lifetimes of data items in insiders’ 
knowledgebases to prevent the threat without affecting the availability of data items. 
Furthermore, the dissertation uses the aforementioned idea in ordering the operations of 
concurrent tasks such that write operations that update risky data items in knowledgebases are 
executed before the risky data items can be used in unauthorized inferences. In addition to 
unauthorized knowledge, the dissertation discusses how insiders can make unauthorized 
modifications in sensitive data items. It introduces new approaches to build Modification Graphs 
that demonstrate the authorized and unauthorized data items which insiders are able to update. 
To prevent this threat, the dissertation provides two methods, which are hiding sensitive 
dependencies and denying risky write requests. In addition to traditional RDBMS, the 
dissertation investigates insider threat in cloud relational database systems (cloud RDMS). It 
discusses the vulnerabilities in the cloud computing structure that may enable insiders to launch 
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attacks. To prevent such threats, the dissertation suggests three models and addresses the 
advantages and limitations of each one.  
 
To prove the correctness and the effectiveness of the proposed approaches, the dissertation uses 
well stated algorithms, theorems, proofs and simulations. The simulations have been executed 
according to various parameters that represent the different conditions and environments of 
executing tasks.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Protecting information is as important as protecting other organizational sensitive assets such as 
money. In this era of rapid revolution in computer technologies and communications, attacks on 
this vital resource are getting more complicated and harmful. Thus, information security has 
become a crucial goal to organizations and individuals. Information security means protecting 
information and information systems from interception, interruption, modification, and 
fabrication in order to preserve the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information 
[LII][NIST95]. Confidentiality means hiding information or resources from unauthorized users 
in order to protect the personnel information privacy, whereas availability means providing 
timely access to information and information resources. Availability is an important part of 
systems’ reliability and design since limited availability of a system is as bad as if the system 
does not exist. Information integrity indicates protecting data against inappropriate or 
unauthorized modifications. Moreover, it means ensuring the accuracy of sources of information, 
which is called information authenticity [Bishop03] [LII].   
 
Research in information security is generally focused on two fields, network security and 
databases security. Network security deals with mechanisms that protect information during 
transmission via networks, while database security represents the methods that protect stored 
information in DBMS. The dissertation concentrates on database security and proposes methods 
to protect relational database systems from insider threat. 
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1.1 Database Security 
Database security is a major field in computer security. Databases are targeted by tremendous 
types of attacks that aim to breach the security of the high value assets that databases store. 
Threats to databases could be physical, such as theft and destroying physical storage, or could be 
logical, which are categorized as follows [Baraani96]. 
a) Unauthorized modifications of information attacks: This type of threat can be launched 
accidentally by authorized users or intentionally by legal or illegal users. Notice that this type 
affects information integrity. 
b) Exposure of information attacks: Information leaks can occur by direct access or indirect 
access to information. Indirect exposure of information is performed by inferring the values 
of unauthorized data items using authorized data items. Hence, information disclosure affects 
the confidentiality of information. 
c) Denial of service attacks: These attacks can be launched by controlling or dominating 
resources such that other users in a system cannot access them. For example, attackers may 
consume the computational resources, such as bandwidth, disk space, or processor time, 
preventing any work from being done. 
 
Significant research has been performed to secure databases against attacks by identifying proper 
security policies and mechanisms. A security policy represents what is expected from a security 
system, whereas a security mechanism demonstrates how to achieve security goals. Security 
policies should have some features or properties that should be satisfied by security mechanisms. 
The properties that a security policy in databases should have include access control, inference, 
consistency, accountability, and user identification. Access control guarantees that direct 
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accesses to objects are granted according to predefined privileges. In addition, a security policy 
should protect sensitive information from exposure by unauthorized users using indirect access 
or inference. Consistency preserves the integrity of databases, and accountability represents the 
requirements to record all accesses to database objects by users. Accountability is an important 
feature for preserving the consistency of databases. Finally, user authentication consists of 
system requirements that lead to the correct identification of legal users in the system 
[Baraani96][Bishop03]. 
 
Extensive research has been done to address mechanisms that achieve the goals of security 
policies. The access matrix model is an example of access control mechanisms. It was introduced 
by Lampson [Lampson71] and improved later by other researchers [Conway72] [Harrison76] to 
manage accesses to resources. The access matrix model uses three components to organize 
accesses, which are subjects, objects and privileges. Subjects indicate users, which are 
represented by the rows of the matrix, objects indicate resources and are represented by the 
columns of the matrix, and privileges indicate permissions of read, write, execute … etc. 
Privileges are represented inside the cells of the matrix. Figure 1.1 shows an example of an 
access matrix model, where Pr(Subi, Objj) represents the privileges that Subi have on the object 
Objj. 
 Objects 
S
u
b
je
ct
s 
 Obj1 Obj2 Obj3 …. Objn 
Sub1 Pr(Sub1, Obj1) Pr(Sub1, Obj2) Pr(Sub1, Obj3) …. Pr(Sub1, Objn) 
Sub2 Pr(Sub2, Obj1) Pr(Sub2, Obj2) Pr(Sub2, Obj3) …. Pr(Sub2, Objn) 
. . . . …  
Subm Pr(Subm, Obj1) Pr(Subm, Obj2) Pr(Subm, Obj3) …. Pr(Subm, Objn) 
 Figure 1.1. An Access Matrix 
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Inference control has been discussed broadly, and many models have been addressed to prevent 
unauthorized inference of information. Inference channels can be eliminated during database 
design by building good and secure schema, or  they can  be  removed  by  evaluating queries to 
ensure that they do not lead to illegal inference. Biskup et. al [Biskup08] proposed mechanisms 
and constraints that reduce inference problem in relational databases to access control, in which 
inference can be controlled. Woodruff and Staddon [David04] introduced the private inference 
control (PIC), which provides inference control on the server side without learning the 
information that is retrieved. Hence, inference problem is discussed in detail in the related work 
chapter. Integrity and authentication can be assured using different techniques such as 
cryptographic techniques. For example, RSA [Rivest78] is used as a public key authentication. 
Similarly, encryption methods such as Tripple-DES [DES] and AES [AES] are used to ensure 
information integrity.   
 
Databases have become increasingly vulnerable to attack due to the vast and continuous 
revolution in communications and new technologies such as cloud computing. Cloud computing 
refers to the use of the internet to host computer resources instead of keeping them on local 
computers. It delivers services (applications) over the internet and the hardware and systems in 
data centers [Armbrust09]. Applications are hosted and accessible through datacenters. 
Resources on the cloud are sold (leased) on demand. The price of leasing resources depends on 
the time duration and the amount and the type of resources needed. Users can have what they 
want from resources at any time. Resources in the cloud are fully managed by the cloud 
resources providers. The management of resources includes monitoring, provisioning, de-
provisioning, workload balancing, and changing requests [Boss]. The services provided by the 
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cloud include Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Software-as-
a-Service (SaaS). Moreover, the Amazon cloud enables insiders to create and manage a 
relational database, which is called Amazon Relational Database Services (RDS) [RDS]. Cloud 
databases induce new security challenges since sensitive data are migrated to the servers of the 
cloud providers. Moreover, databases are managed and maintained by the employees of services 
providers. This maximizes threat, especially insider threat, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2 Insider Threat 
Insider threat is a critical security problem. The threat of insiders can be posed intentionally by 
malicious insiders or unintentionally. Malicious insider threat is defined as the threat that is 
caused by a person who has authorized access privileges and knowledge of the computer systems 
of an organization, and is inspired to antagonistically influence the organization [Brackney04]. 
For the rest of the dissertation, we will use the term “insider threat” to indicate malicious insider 
threat. We define insider threat according to relational database systems, which is the context of 
the dissertation, as follows. 
 
Definition 1 (Insider Threat). Insider threat is the threat that is posed by a person who has 
authorized access and knowledge of the relational database system s/he uses, is familiar with the 
dependencies and constraints among data items, and is motivated to violate the security policy of 
the system throughout authorized access. 
 
Insiders could be employees, contractors, or business partners. They have the capabilities, which 
outsiders do not have, that enable them to launch attacks. In the context of relational database 
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systems, insiders are familiar with the structure of the relational database systems on which they 
are working. That is, they are familiar with the dependencies and constraints among data items, 
the sensitive information and the insensitive information, and the inference channels insiders can 
exploit to infer unauthorized information. Insiders get knowledge during their work on 
organizations’ systems. They can get a part of the knowledge through their activities and 
transactions in systems, and they get other parts by collaborating with other insiders in the 
systems. This accumulated knowledge enables insiders to discover the strengths and weaknesses 
in the defense mechanisms and the systems’ structure. Nonetheless, outsiders have little 
information (in comparison to insiders) about the structure of the systems they attack. Moreover, 
insiders use legal paths to breach the systems’ security throughout legal access, whereas 
outsiders rely on violating systems security using different methods such as bogus URLs in 
phishing attacks, SQL injection, Man-in-the Middle attacks … etc. Table 1.1 shows some 
examples of insiders’ attacks and outsiders’ attacks according to different criteria [Probst10].  
Table 1.1 Insider Attacks vs. Outsider Attacks [Probst10]. 
Attribute Outsiders Insiders 
Authentication Penetrations, attacks on authentication 
Infrastructures. 
Misuse of intended authority by over-
authorized users, illegal seizure of 
super-user access and root keys. 
Authorization Unauthorized exploitation of 
inadequate controls. 
Authorized manipulation of access 
controls. 
Confidentiality  Unencrypted password capture or 
expose of encrypted passwords. 
National security leaks and other 
disclosures; access to crypto keys. 
Integrity Creating Trojan horses in untrusted 
components, Word macro viruses, 
untrustworthy Web code, Man-in-the-
Middle attacks. 
Inserting Trojan horses or trapdoors 
in trusted or untrusted components, 
altering configurations, schedules, 
and priorities. 
Accountability Masquerading, DoS attacks on 
accounting infrastructures. 
Hacking beneath the audit trails, 
altering audit logs, compromising 
misuse detection. 
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According to different surveys [Gordon05][Cert11], insider threat is as risky as outsiders’ threat 
(hackers) due to the extreme harm that it may pose. The 2005 FBI Computer Crime Survey 
[Gordon05] reported that trusted insiders were responsible of about 33% of all security breaches 
in 2005. Similarly, the 2011 Cyber Security Watch Survey [CERT11] showed that 58% of 
attacks are caused by outsiders, whereas 21% of attacks are caused by insiders. Figure 1.2 shows 
how the percentage of security breaches by insiders and outsiders have changed over the years, 
according to the latter survey. Moreover, the survey shows that insider threat is as costly as 
outsider threat. However, Forrester Research [Forrester11] showed that insider threat is the most 
costly type of incident. In addition, after analyzing the security practices of more than 300 
European, American, and Australian enterprises, Forrester estimated that insiders were 
responsible for 75% of data security incidents in those enterprises in 2010. Similarly, Verizon 
Business breach report [Cooper08][Subashini10] stated that outsiders exposed about 30,000 
records, whereas insiders exposed about 375,000 records indicating that the cost of insider threat 
is greatly more than the cost of outsider threat. 
 
 
Obviously, many surveys have shown that insider threat is an immense and urgent security 
problem. Yet, organizations are investing very little to defend their systems against insider threat. 
Most organizations’ investments are focused on protecting their assets from outsiders’ threat. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010
29% 
22% 
32% 31% 34% 27% 
71% 
80% 
68% 69% 66% 
73% 
Insiders (Short bar)
Outsiders (Long bar)
Figure 1.2. Security Violations by Insiders and Outsiders 
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Organizations rely on insiders’ morals and ethics not to violate systems security. Nonetheless, 
surveys show that this assumption is incorrect. Mechanisms that have been proposed for 
protecting data from outside attacks are inappropriate to secure systems from authorized users 
who may misuse their privileges. Thus, the development of mechanisms that protect sensitive 
data from insiders has become a key demand due to the amount of harm that can be caused by 
malicious insiders. 
 
1.3 The Contribution of the Dissertation 
The focus of this dissertation is on the insider as an object with properties and capabilities that 
facilitate exposing systems’ unauthorized information or making unauthorized changes. The 
knowledgebases of insiders and their privileges form their power. Therefore, insider threat 
prediction and prevention mechanisms should identify those properties before going forward in 
the prediction process. Discovering and representing the knowledgebases and privileges of 
insiders have gotten a significant focus in this work through developing and using many graphs. 
As mentioned earlier, the dissertation discusses insider threat in relational database systems in 
detail. It describes the factors, resources, and features that facilitate insider threat such as 
dependencies and constraints. In addition, the dissertation demonstrates the paths and approaches 
that insiders may follow to acquire unauthorized information. Furthermore, it investigates the 
approaches that insiders may use to make unauthorized modifications to data items. To protect 
relational databases from these types of insider threat, the dissertation proposes effective 
methods to detect, prevent, or mitigate those attacks.  
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In addition, the dissertation shows how different sequences of execution of the same operations 
of concurrent tasks impose different levels of risk. In addition, it shows how some sequences 
may lead to limiting the availability of data items or posing threat. For this case, the dissertation 
shows how to order the operations of concurrent tasks in a safe sequence that prevents insider 
threat without limiting insiders’ tasks. Furthermore, the dissertation investigates the problem in 
the cloud computing environment and addresses new vulnerabilities that may be used by insiders 
to launch attacks. It introduces different models to tackle insider threat in cloud relational 
databases. Finally, the dissertation provides algorithms, theorems, proofs and simulations to 
prove the efficiency of the proposed approaches in defending relational databases against insider 
threat. 
 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter introduces some related 
work. Chapter 3 introduces the types of dependencies and constraints in relational database 
systems. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the paths and approaches that insiders may follow to acquire 
unauthorized information or make unauthorized changes in sensitive data items respectively. 
Moreover, the chapters propose methods to detect and prevent such attacks. Organizing accesses 
to data items in concurrent tasks is discussed in chapter 6, while chapter 7 discusses insider 
threat in cloud computing and suggests methods to mitigate insider threat in cloud relational 
databases. Finally, chapter 8 presents the conclusions.  
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2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK  
 
 
Protecting information from insider threat is a very important and difficult research field. Little 
research has been performed in this area. Moreover, most research in insider threat has been 
focused at the system level. Very little research has been performed at the application level such 
as database systems. In this chapter, we introduce some related work that has been accomplished 
in this area. Furthermore, since dependencies are a major part of insider threat in relational 
database systems, some work on dependencies and inference channels is introduced. In addition, 
some work in cloud security is presented to understand the vulnerabilities that threaten cloud 
relational databases and increase the possibility of insider threat. 
 
2.1  Dependencies and Inference Channels 
Dependencies play a major role in the insider threat problem. Dependencies and constraints can 
be used by insiders to infer unauthorized information or make unauthorized modifications. 
Dependencies as well as the inference problem have been discussed extensively by many 
researchers. Most inferences in relational database systems are acquired by combining database 
constraints with insensitive data items. Inference channels can be discovered during database 
design [Dawson99, Marks96a, Su91, Yi98] or during queries processing [Marks96b, Stachour90, 
Farkas07]. In the first approach, database design is modified or the classifications of some data 
are elevated to remove inference channels. In the second approach, inference is detected during 
the execution of queries. To remove inference channels in the latter case, malicious queries are 
either rejected or modified.  
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Farkas and Jajodia [Farkas07] presented a survey of some research in data inference control in 
different fields such as statistical and multilevel databases, data mining and web. They discussed 
how users use insensitive data to get sensitive data to which they have no direct access. Brodsky 
et al. [Brodsky00] discussed the inference channels that happen when database constraints are 
used with insensitive data to get information about sensitive data items. They presented the 
Disclosure Monitor (DiMon) model that detects and removes inference channels that are created 
by database constraints. Moreover, they used the Disclosure Inference Engine (DiIE) that 
retrieves all possible information that can be acquired based on users’ previous and current 
queries and database constraints. Their work was well structured and supported by robust 
algorithms and theorems that analyse the problem and prove the completeness and soundness of 
the proposed approaches. However, their work considered the problem from a static point of 
view. That is, they neither considered the updates on data items nor discussed the effects of 
updates on data items’ lifetimes.  
 
Farkas et al. [Farkas01] demonstrated how updates on data items can increase data availability. 
They stated that updates make data outdated, and stated that the inference based on outdated data 
does not pose any threat since it would be incorrect. They used this idea to extend the DiMon 
model used by Brodsky et. al [Brodsky00], which is discussed in the previous paragraph, and 
developed a new model called Dynamic Disclosure Monitor. The new model ensures that only 
the inference based on up-to-date data is considered a threat. To facilitate implementing the idea, 
they established a new mechanism, called the Update Consolidator, that uses a user’s history file, 
updates on data items, and database constraints to generate a new history file for the user in 
which outdated data are marked, and then, only valid inferences are considered. The authors 
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assumed that updates always make data expired. Nonetheless, in this dissertation, we show that 
considering modified data as always expired data may lead to exposing sensitive information. 
Moreover, we state the conditions that an update process should meet in order to consider an 
updated data as expired.   
 
Most researchers focus on functional dependencies when dealing with inference channels. 
However, Yip and Levitt [Yip98] showed that detecting inference channels using functional 
dependencies only is insufficient. They introduced new inference rules based on analayzing the 
data stored in databases. The rules are constructed using the overlap between the results of 
queries, uniqueness of some tuples in databases, and the complement of the results of queries. 
For instance, as an example of unique tuples, if Bob is the only manager of an age between 30 
and 50, then the query that retrieves the salaries of all managers of any age between 30 and 50 
exposes Bob’s salary. The query itself could be allowed, but the results that it returns in this case 
should not be allowed. Using the new rules, the authors built an inference detection system that 
uses a rule based approach to detect inference channels. Morgenstern [Morgenstern87] defined 
the INFER function that computes the amount of knowledge a user can get about data objects in 
database systems using dependencies and constraints. The INFER function is used to define the 
set of all information that can be inferred using a core, which is a set of data objects, such as 
attributes, relationships and inference channels. Morgenstern employed classical information 
theory, which was developed by Shannon [Shanon48], to measure inference in multilevel 
databases. In information theory, entropy quantifies the uncertainty of information or the missing 
information content when the value of a random variable is unknown. The more uncertain or 
random an event the more entropy it has [Motahari09]. Conditional entropy is the uncertainty of 
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a random variable when some information is given. Morgenstern used this concept to compute 
the amount of inference in databases. The idea is based on computing the uncertainty (the range 
of values) of a data item when no other information is given, and computing the uncertainty of 
the data item when another data item (or a group of data items) is given. By using these values, 
the INFER function computes how much information a user can get about a data item by 
knowing other data items.    
 
2.2 Insider Threat at System Level 
Different researchers have introduced different definitions for insiders at system level. Brackney 
and Anderson [Brackney04] defined an insider as a person who has knowledge of or access 
privileges to the information or services of a system, whereas they defined a malicious insider as 
an insider who is motivated to breach a system’s security intentionally. Bishop and Gates 
[Bishop08] defined an insider according to two primitive actions. The first one is to breach a 
security policy using authorized access, and the second action is to break an access control policy 
by obtaining unauthorized access. Obviously, the authors defined insiders based on attributes or 
actions, instead of defining a person as either an insider or not. That is, an insider could be a 
person or a system that has access privileges to a domain or a system. We should mention here 
that in this dissertation we use the term “insider”  to indicate a malicious insider. 
 
Some researchers used existing methods of detecting external   threat to   detect   insider   threat, 
while others introduced new methods. Spitzner [Spitzner03] used honeypot technologies for 
insider threat detection. Althebyan and Panda [Althebyan08a][ Althebyan08b] introduced new 
methods to deal with this problem. The authors presented new graphs, which are knowledge 
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graphs and dependency graphs, that can be used in insider threat prediction and prevention. The 
knowledge graph of an insider shows the objects about which the insider has information, 
whereas, a dependency graph shows the dependencies among objects that can be used by insiders 
to get new knowledge. Bardford and Hu [Bradford05] used intrusion detection mechanisms with 
forensics tools to detect insider threat in a layered approach. 
 
Park and Giordano [Park06] developed a role-based profile analysis method for preventing 
insider misuse by focusing on the relationship between insiders and their systems to detect 
anomalies. Their approach works by analyzing the behaviors of insiders based on their roles. If 
an insider uses the associated methods in a task according to his/her role, the insider has no 
malicious intention. However, if the patterns of methods are not appropriate to the task, a 
malicious activity alert is raised. Hu et. al [Hu06] used the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) 
and genetic algorithms to generate rules that can detect the differences between users roles and 
the processes, where the existence of differences indicates insider threat. Chinchani et. al 
[Chinchani05] proposed a methodology for insider threat assessment, which uses a new threat 
model called Key Challenge Graph. The new graph relies on an insider’s knowledge, the location 
of the targeted information (key), and the capabilities of the insider to assess the threat. They 
addressed the conditions of successful attacks and stated formulas for computing the cost of 
attacks.  
Aleman-Meza et. al [Menza05] proposed an ontological approach using semantic associations to 
detemine the relevance of a document to a domain. Their approach starts by determining the 
context of investigation, which represents a set of entity classes, relationships, instances and 
keywords values. The goal of specifying a context of investigation is to capture the types of 
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entities and relationships that are considered important. Next, documents are processed to 
produce semantically annontated documents, which indicate documents with metadata that 
describes them. After that, the relevance of a document to the context of investigation is 
computed and classified according to a list of relevance levels. Based on the relevance level, the 
proposed methodology helps in addressing illegal documents access, which in turn detects 
insider threat.  
 
The research work in this section dealt with insider threat at the system level without considering 
relational databases. The next section introduces an overview of some research that has been 
performed on insider threat in relational databases.  
 
2.3 Insider Threat in Relational Database Systems 
Very little research has been performed on insider threat at the database level. Chagarlamudi et. 
al [Chagarlamudi09] used a Petri-Nets model to identify malicious insiders’ activities. They used 
the model to prevent unauthorized modifications in data items. In their work, Petri-Nets are used 
to model the normal tasks for each user in a system, where places in a Petri-Net represent the 
transactions of the modeled task. That is, the Petri-Net model of a task represents the partial 
order of executing the transactions of the task. Any execution of the transactions of a task that 
does not follow the order in the associated Petri-Net is considered a malicious activity.  
 
Jabbour and Menasce [Jabbour09a] showed a list of security breaches that insiders can launch in 
systems. In addition, they described a preliminary model that can be integrated into systems for 
self-protection from insider threat. In their other work [Jabbour09b], Jabbour and Menasce 
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proposed a self-protection mechanism that is fully integrated into the computing system, called 
the Insider Threat Security Architecture (ITSA). The new framework forces privileged users, 
even DBAs, to go through defense mechanisms before making changes to systems or security 
policies. The authors presented a security scenario which shows that privileged users can expose 
the system that the users protect, and showed how similar scenarios can be mitigated using the 
ITSA framework. Other researchers [Hu03][Chung99] developed insider threat detection models 
based on profiling data access patterns or profiling user access patterns using log files.  
 
Mathew et. al [Mathew10] relied on the results of queries rather than the syntax to detect 
malicious insiders’ activities using a data-centric approach. They claimed that queries with 
similar syntax can retrieve different results, which enable insiders to launch malicious queries 
similar (syntactically) to legitimate ones to pose a threat. In order to reduce the complexity of 
retrieving and checking the possibly huge results of queries, they suggested an approach that 
picks a small number of tuples that is representative and sufficient to detect insider threat. 
Garfinkel et al. [Garfinkel02] suggested retrieving a range of results in malicious queries instead 
of exact results. Using this idea, they provided algorithms for maintaining confidentiality in 
databases. Their approach adds concealment vectors to database queries which return interval 
results to protect the original database information from the disclosure of sensitive information. 
White and Panda [White10] proposed approaches to identify critical data items, which are the 
target of insiders in general. Addressing critical data items helps in focusing the monitoring 
process on specific elements of databases which makes fighting insider threat more effective.  
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Since this dissertation discusses insider threat in cloud Relational Databases, the next section 
introduces some related work in cloud computing, especially in cloud security. 
 
2.4 Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing is a promising technology that offers large-scale and on-demand computing 
infrastructure. According to Kaufman [Kaufman09], the spending of the US government on 
cloud computing projects will pass 15 billion dollars by 2015. Achieving low cost live migration 
is one of the goals of the research on cloud computing. Das et. al [Das11] introduced Albatross, 
an end-to-end technique for live migration in shared storage databases. Albatross maximizes the 
availability during a migration process by migrating the cache and the state of active transactions 
instead of stopping transactions at source nodes and restarting them at destination nodes. Zephyr 
[Elmore11] minimizes service interruption and increases availability during live migration by 
using a synchronized dual mode. The proposed dual mode enables both the source and 
destination nodes to execute transactions simultaneously while the migration process is being 
run. Zephyr transfers the tenant’s (migrated application) metadata to the destination to start 
executing new transactions; meanwhile, the source node continues executing the transactions that 
were active before starting the migration process.   
 
Cloud security is one of the major problems in cloud computing. Arshad et. al [Arshad09] 
presented models to quantify cloud security as a set of security metrics. Furthermore, they 
discussed the problem of random migration of virtual machines. Live migration of a virtual 
machine (VM) aims to balance the load among all VMs. However, a VM may be migrated to a 
node without taking into account security requirements. In this case, a VM could be migrated to 
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a less secure node than the one that is migrated from. The authors called this problem the 
“random migration problem”. They suggested using Service Level Agreements (SLA) by 
allowing the owner of a VM to determine the security requirements for his/her VM using SLAs; 
therefore, the resource manager can take into account these requirements before migrating the 
VM. Wang et. al [Wang09] investigated the problem of data security in cloud data storage. They 
utilized the homomorphic token with distributed verification of erasure coded data to achieve 
storage correctness insurance.  Hwang et. al [Hwang09] demonstrated a comparison between a 
number of cloud providers regarding architecture, reliability and security. Furthermore, they 
addressed outlines for an integrated architecture to guarantee security and privacy in cloud 
applications. Chow et. al [Chow09] suggested extending control measures in the cloud by using 
trusted computing and cryptography.  
 
The research in cloud databases is still in its early stages. Few papers have been published in this 
field. Hacigumus et. al [Hacigumus12] introduced CloudDB, a data management platform in the 
cloud. CloudDB has several features that satisfy the cloud environment. It maintains three types 
of data stores, which are row store, key-value store, and analytics store, to satisfy different 
workload types.  For instance, analytics store is a read-optimized and a throughput oriented to 
efficiently handle OLAP workloads, while key-store is used to achieve higher levels of 
scalability for read/write intensive workloads. Moreover, CloudDB uses both partitioning and 
replication techniques to achieve availability and scalability.  The cloud relational database 
service has been introduced by some providers such as Amazon [RDS12] (Amazon RDS) and 
Microsoft [Azure12] (Microsoft SQL Azure). Curino et. al [Curino11] introduced a new 
comprehensive framework for relational databases on the cloud, called Relational Cloud. It 
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supports new models for efficient multi-tenancy to minimize the resources needed for a 
workload, an elastic scale-out model to satisfy growing workloads, and models to preserve 
database privacy. Furthermore, Relational Cloud involves techniques for efficient partitioning, 
replication, and migration to achieve maximum availability and reliability.  Unlike other multi-
tenant databases, Relational Cloud does not mix the data of different tenants into a shared 
database or table. Instead, databases belonging to different tenants are run on the same database 
server.  We should mention here that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no concrete research 
that has been performed on the problem of insider threat in cloud relational databases.   
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3. DEPENDENCIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Dependencies and constraints play a crucial role in insider threat in relational database systems 
(RDBMS). This chapter discusses the types of dependencies and constraints among data items in 
RDBMS. To demonstrate the problem, let us introduce the following example. Suppose that 
Figure 3.1 represents a part of the relational database developed by a university. Assume that the 
database has the following dependencies. 
 
- Rank Base_Salary. 
- {Base_Salary, Experience}  Total_Salary. 
- Number of Dependents  HI_Premium. 
- {HI_Premium, Total_Salary, Tax}  Net_Salary. 
- Score  Grade.  
 
Suppose that Net_Salary and Total_Salary are calculated using the following formulas: 
 
Total_Salary = Base_Salary + 500 * Experience.  
Net_salary = Total_Salary – (Total_Salary * Tax + HI_Premium). 
 
The next subsections define the types of dependencies and constraints using this example. 
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 Employee Table                                                                      Student Table 
EMP_ID FName LName Rank HI_Premium ..  STD_ID FName LName …  
 
Salary Table                                                                                    
 
     Course Table                                                                                    
EMP_ID Base_Salary Experience …  CRS_NO Name Description …  
 
Dependent Table 
 
           Grade Table 
EMP_ID Dependent_Name Relationship …  … Score Grade …  
 
Tax Table 
 
Salary Tax …  
<70K 6%   
70K - 90K 8%   
>=90K 10%   
                                                                           .    
                                                                           .    
                                                                           .                                        
 
 
Figure  3.1 A Part of a University Relational Database 
 
3.2 Types of Dependencies 
Two data items X and Y have a dependency relationship if at least one of them depends on the 
other. The dependency between X and Y that is represented by the notation XY means that Y 
depends on X. Dependencies are classified into three types: functional dependencies, 
multivalued dependencies [Heping05], and fuzzy dependencies [Zuo04]. In addition to these 
types, the dissertation classifies dependencies according to a number of categories, which are the 
strength, the direction, and the transitivity. We classify the strength of a dependency into two 
types: Strong and Weak, which are defined as follows.  
 
Definition 11 (A Strong Dependency). Given a dependency XY, where X and Y are two data 
items, the dependency is called a Strong Dependency if a change in X must make a change in Y. 
This type is represented by XY. 
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Definition 12 (A Weak Dependency). Given the two data items X and Y, if a change in X may or 
may not make a change in Y, then the two data items have a dependency called a Weak 
Dependency and is represented by  X  Y.  
 
For example, the dependency (Rank  Base_Salary), in Figure 3.1, is an example of a Strong 
Dependency, whereas the dependency (Score  Grade) is an example of a Weak Dependency.  
The direction indicates the source (left side) and the destination (right side) of a dependency. The 
direction of a dependency is classified into One_Way and Two_Way (Cyclic) dependencies. The 
following two definitions explain these types. 
 
Definition 13 (A One_Way Dependency). Given a dependency XY, where X and Y are two 
data items, if Y depends on X but X does not depend on Y, then this dependency is called a 
One_Way Dependency and is represented by X Y. 
 
Definition 14 (A Two_Way Dependency or A Cyclic Dependency). Given the two data items X 
and Y and the dependency XY, X and Y have a Two_Way Dependency if both data items 
depend on each other. This type of dependency is represented by X⇆ Y. 
 
The dependency (Rank  Base_Salary) is an example of a One_Way dependency. A Two_Way 
Dependency contains two relationships between the two data items, which may be both Strong, 
both are Weak, or one is Weak and the other is Strong. Two_Way Dependencies mostly exist 
between tables, which may have more than one dependency.    
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Finally, based on the transitivity property, dependencies are classified into Direct and Transitive 
dependencies as follows. 
 
Definition 15 (A Direct Dependency). Given a dependency XY, where X and Y are two data 
items, the dependency is called a Direct Dependency if a change in X directly affects (make a 
change in) Y. Such type of dependency is represented by X Y. 
 
Definition 16 ( A Transitive Dependency). Consider the three data items X, Y, and Z that have 
the dependencies {Y  Z, X Y}. If a change in X makes a change in Y, and this change in Y 
makes a change in Z, then Z depends transitively on X and the dependency is represented by X  
Z. 
 
For example, the Dependency (Rank  Base_Salary) is an example of a Direct Dependency, 
whereas the dependency (Rank    Net_Salary) is an example of a Transitive Dependency. 
Obviously, a change in the Rank changes the Base_Salary, which in turn changes the 
Net_Salary.  
 
Dependencies exist at different levels of granularities in relational database systems. These levels 
are the Low Level (Attribute Level), the Intermediate Level (Record level) and the High Level 
(Table Level).  All types of dependencies, except the Cyclic (Two_Way) Dependency, are 
usually found at the Low Level.  Actually, some relational database systems may have a Cyclic 
Dependency at the Low Level, but we have not found a good example of it. Likewise, all types 
of dependencies exist at the High Level since a table inherits the dependencies that are present at 
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its Attribute Level. That is, a dependency between two tables is basically a dependency between 
attributes that belong to the tables. However, two tables may have more than one type of 
dependency. Similarly, records inherit dependencies from their attributes. This means that 
various types of dependencies exist at Record Level.  
 
3.3 Constraints on Dependencies 
Dependencies may involve constraints. That is, a change on a dependent data item (the right side 
of a dependency) occurs only when a specified constraint is met on the left side of the 
dependency. Constraints are classified into two types: those that restrict change in an attribute’s 
value, and those that monitor insertion or deletion of records. Section 3.3.1 discusses how to 
represent the first type, whereas the second type is discussed section 3.3.2. 
 
3.3.1 Using Petri Nets for Representing Constraints and Dependencies 
Representing dependencies and constraints between data items facilitates understanding the 
relationships between them and the overall structure of relational database systems. For example, 
in order to change the Grade of a student to ‘A’, his/her Score should be changed to a value 
above 90. This is an example about the first type of constraints on the dependency Score  
Grade.  
 
The modeling tool that is needed for representation should show the flow of information between 
different data items at different granularities. Moreover, it should be able to represent various 
forms of dependencies and constraints. Some constraints could be complex.  In some cases, a 
dependency can be represented using a formula, whereas in other cases it is difficult to represent 
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dependencies that way. For instance, consider the dependency constraints between the two 
attributes t1 and t2 that says the value of t2 must equal c3 when t1 is in the range c1 and c2, and t2 
must equal c4 when the value of t1 is less than c1; otherwise, the value of t2 is c5, where c1, c2, c3, 
c4 and c5 are constants.  
 
To meet these goals, the dissertation uses Petri Nets [Murata89] to construct dependency graphs 
that represents dependencies as well as constraints. Petri Nets are a mathematical and graphical 
modeling tool. Basically, they are used to represent information processing flow in systems that 
are nondeterministic, parallel, distributed, asynchronous or concurrent. A Petri Net is a directed, 
weighted and bipartite graph. It consists of two types of nodes: places and transitions. Places are 
represented by circles, while transitions are represented by bars or boxes. Arcs are from input 
places to transitions or from transitions to output places. A weight on an arc represents tokens, 
which are represented by dots in the input place. A transition can fire if the number of tokens in 
its input place is greater than or equal to the weight of the corresponding arc. The properties of 
Petri Nets and other details are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Interested readers may refer 
to [Murata 89].  Figure 3.2 shows an example of a Petri-Net representing the formula 
X=2*a+3*b, where the tokens are represented by black spots. In the rest of this dissertation, the 
conditions for firing are assumed to be met always, thus, the tokens will not be shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.Using Petri Nets to Represent a Formula 
+ 2 
3 
X 
 
a 
b 
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To show more examples of how Petri-Nets can be used to represent dependencies and 
constraints, consider the two tables T1(t1,t2,t3) and T2(t4,t5,t6,t7) having the following 
dependencies and constraints: 
- c1 =< t1<= c2 t2 = c3 
- c1> t1 t2 = c4 
- t1> c2  t2 = c5 
- t4=3*t3+1 
- t6=2*t2+3*t5 
 
The dependency graph that is constructed by using Perti-Nets is called the Constraint and 
Dependency Graph (CDG). Figure 3.3 shows the CDG of the previous tables using Petri Nets. In 
the figure, one of the three transitions connected to the attribute t1 can be fired. Actually, the 
value of the attribute determines which transition is fired. Thus, the token transfers to one of the 
constants c3, c4 or c5, which in turn follows its way to the attribute t2. This makes the attribute t2 
equal the value of the constant from which the token comes. This mapping represents the 
dependency and constraints between t1 and t2. Notice that each attribute name is preceded by the 
name of the table to which it belongs. The dependency between the attributes {t2, t5}, on one 
side, and the attribute t6, on the other side, is represented using the same way of representing the 
formula in Figure 3.2.  Similarly, the dependency between t3 and t4 is represented in the same 
manner. The transition with no inputs is called a source transition. It is used in this graph to make 
three copies of the attribute t1. This aims to explain that firing t6 does not always depend on 
firing t1. That is, a change in t6 may be caused by a change in t1 or a change in t2. 
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Obviously, Figure 3.3 shows how Petri Nets can be used efficiently to construct CDGs. 
Moreover, since each attribute name is preceded by the corresponding table name, both attribute 
and table level dependencies and constraints can be represented. Dependencies and constraints 
between records are shown implicitly. Strictly speaking, a dependency between two records that 
belong to two different tables can be reduced to a dependency between attributes. For instance, if 
an attribute k in a table B depends on an attribute j in a table A, then every record in B depends 
on its related record in A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CDGs are used to build the knowledge graphs of insiders. Strictly speaking, CDGs are used to 
show how insiders can follow dependencies to infer knowledge about data items to which they 
do not have access privileges. Constraints in CDGs show what values of data items are stored in 
the knowledgebase of insiders exactly. The complete details are discussed later in chapter 4. 
+ 
Figure 3.3. A Constraint and Dependency Graph CDG 
+ 
2 
3 
          T2.t6  
 T1.t2 
T2.t5 
c1 =< T1.t1 <= c2 
T1.t1 
T1.t1 < c1 
T1.t1 > c2 
c3 
 
 
c4 
c5 
 T1.t2 
+ 3 
 
T2.t4  
1 
T1.t3 
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3.3.2 The Dependency Matrix 
Petri Nets can be used to represent constraints on dependencies between attributes. However, it 
cannot represent the second type of constraints, which is insertion or deletion of records. An 
insertion/deletion of a record to/from a table may make a change in the dependent table. For 
instance, consider the dependency between the Employee and the Dependents tables in Figure 
3.1. Suppose that the table Employee contains the attribute Health_Insurance_Premium, which 
depends on the number of dependents of the corresponding employee. In this case, a change in 
the number of dependents (insertion or deletion of a record into/from the Dependents table) of 
the employee changes the value of his/her health insurance. Strictly speaking, the insertion or 
deletion of records changes the related record of the corresponding employee. This type of 
constraint exists at both table and record levels.  
 
To represent both types of constraints at the table level (and implicitly at the record level), the 
Dependency Matrix is used. Figure 3.4 represents an example of a dependency matrix that shows 
dependencies between different tables as well as the constraints on such dependencies. The first 
column and the first row represent tables. Each cell contains a set of pairs (C, T), where C 
denotes a constraint and T denotes the type of the dependency. The value 2 means a Strong 
Dependency and 1 indicates a Weak Dependency. For instance, the cell (T1, T2) means that if the 
constraint C1 is satisfied on T1, a change on T2 must happen since the dependency is strong. As 
discussed earlier, two tables may have different dependencies, which are represented in the 
Dependency Matrix by multiple pairs in the given cell. Using the Dependency Matrix, Hot and 
Safe clusters are constructed. A Safe Cluster is defined as follows.  
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Definition 17 (Safe Cluster). Given the Dependency Matrix of a relational database, a Safe 
Cluster SC ={T1, … ,Tn} is a group of tables in which each table Ti is independent, directly and 
transitively, from all other tables that belong to the same cluster. 
 
Whereas, a Hot Cluster is defined as follows. 
 
Definition 18 (Hot Cluster). Given the dependency matrix of a relational database, a Hot 
Cluster HC = {T1,… ,Tn} is a set of tables in which each table Ti is directly dependent on all 
other tables that belong to the same cluster.   
 
Based on Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 shows examples of Hot and Safe Clusters, where Hot Clusters 
are represented by dashed ovals and Safe Clusters are represented by solid ones. For instance, 
clusters C3 to C7 are Safe Clusters, whereas clusters C1 and C2 are Hot Clusters. As shown in 
Figure 3.5, Hot Clusters and/or Safe Clusters may overlap. Notice that tables that belong to 
different clusters may still have a dependency relationship, but not a Cyclic Dependency. For 
instance, tables T1 and T2 still have a One_Way dependency.   
 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
T1 - {(C1,2), (C8,2)} {(C2,2)} 0 0 0 
T2 0 - 0 {(C3,2)} 0 0 
T3 0 0 - 0 {(C4,2) 0 
T4 0 {(C5,1)} 0 - 0 0 
T5 0 0 {(C6,2)} 0 - 0 
T6 0 0 0 0 0 - 
 
Figure 3.4.  A Dependency Matrix 
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Figure 3.5. Hot and safe clusters 
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4. INSIDER THREAT: UNAUTHORIZED KNOWLEDGE AQUISTION 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Insiders may be able to predict the values of data items, which they may not be authorized to 
access, by investigating dependencies and constraints. For instance, in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, 
assume that an insider has a read access to t1 and has no authorized access to t2.  In this case, s/he 
can infer the value of t2 using the associated dependencies and constraints. Similarly, assume that 
the insider has a read access to t2 and has no access to t1. Then, if the value of t2 is changed to c3, 
the insider would realize that the value of t1 has been changed to c1. The latter case is called 
Cyclic Inference. Likewise, the insider can deduce the correct value of t1 if the value of t2 is 
changed to either c4 or c5. Thus, insiders may use their knowledge about data dependencies and 
constraints to acquire knowledge about some data items to which s/he has no authorized read 
access. This chapter demonstrates how insiders can get unauthorized information and broaden 
their knowledgebases using dependencies and constraints.  
 
4.2 Insiders’ Knowledge 
Understanding the various types of dependencies and constraints in relational databases enables 
us to discover the knowledge that insiders can get. As discussed earlier, insiders may use 
dependencies and constraints to acquire unauthorized knowledge, which are classified into three 
types: inferred knowledge, computed knowledge, and aggregated knowledge. The next 
subsections address how insiders can acquire these different types of knowledge.  
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4.2.1 Inferred Knowledge 
The type of knowledge that insiders can get using inference is called inferred knowledge, which 
is defined formally as follows: 
 
Definition 19 (Inferred Knowledge).  Given a dependency A  B in a relational database, 
where A and B are data items, the knowledge that an insider deduces about B by accessing A is 
called inferred knowledge. 
 
The knowledge that an insider infers can be partial or exact. To measure the amount of 
knowledge an insider can get, the INFER function [Morgenstern87] is used, which is as follows: 
INFER (x  y) = (H(y) – Hx(y)) /H(y)                                                (1) 
INFER (xy) represents the amount of information about a data item y that can be inferred using 
a data item x. H(y) represents the uncertainty of y and Hx(y) represents the uncertainty of y given 
x. The amount of inferred knowledge ranges between 0 for no knowledge to 1 for exact 
knowledge.  
 
An insider may use functional dependencies to infer knowledge. For instance, let us consider the 
trivial example of the functional dependency between the attribute “Score” and the attribute 
“Grade” (Score  Grade). Figure 4.1 shows the dependency and constraints. Hence, the 
dependency is a Weak and a Direct dependency. 
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An insider can infer information if he/she has access to any side of the dependency, but the 
amount of information s/he can get differs. For instance, the uncertainty of the Grade is 5 since 
we assume that grades range from A to F. However, the uncertainty of the Grade given the Score 
is 0 since if the insider is given a Score, he/she can directly and exactly infer the Grade value. 
The amount of information the insider can get about the Grade is calculated as follows: 
 
INFER( Score  Grade) = (H(Grade)-HScore(Grade)) / H(Grade)  = (5-0)/5 = 100%. 
 
This means that the insider can get exact knowledge about the Grade if he/she has an access to 
the Score. On the other hand, if the insider has an access to the Grade attribute only, the 
knowledge that s/he can get is partial since the dependency is Weak. Moreover, the amount of 
information s/he can get using this dependency is either 90% or 40% since the Score intervals are 
not equally likely. Notice that the insider can infer information using Cyclic Inference. Hence, if 
the dependency is a Strong, the insider can get exact knowledge.  
The amount of information that can be inferred when the Score interval is 10 is computed as 
follows: 
 
INFER(Grade  Score) = (Score-HGrade(Score)) / H(Score)  = (101-10)/101 = 90%. 
 
Score Grade 
>=90 and <=100 A 
>=80 and <90 B 
>=70 and <80 C 
>=60 and <70 D 
<60 F 
Figure 4.1  A  Functional Dependency 
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While the amount of information that can be inferred when the Score interval is less than 60 is 
computed as follows: 
 
INFER(Grade  Score) = H(Score)-HGrade(Score)) / H(Score)  = (101 – 60)/101 = 40%. 
 
An insider can also gain knowledge using fuzzy dependencies. For example, consider the fuzzy 
dependency between the “Project type” attribute and the “Project name” attribute as shown in 
Figure 2. Suppose that James is working at the company F as a programmer, then the uncertainty 
about which projects he/she is working on is 4 since there are 4 projects at the company. 
However, if the insider is given that James is working on an accounting project (given access to 
project type), then the amount of knowledge the insider can get about the projects on which 
James is working is computed as follows: 
 
INFER(project type  project name) = (project name) - Hproject type(project name))/H(project 
name)= (4-2)/4 = 50%. 
 
 
 
 
 
Multivalued dependencies [Su87] do not enable insiders to infer information. To clarify this 
point, consider Figure 4.3 that shows an example of a trivial multivalued dependency between 
the attribute Emp and the attribute Project. Suppose that an insider has an access to the records of 
employee B, and the insider has no access to the records of employee A. Using the records of B, 
Project type Project name Due date 
Accounting A Jan,1 
Accounting B Feb,1 
Marketing C Jan,1 
Marketing D Feb,1 
Figure 4.2 Projects in a Company F 
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the insider can get the values of the “Project” attribute of employee A, which are M and N in the 
example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the following observations need to be taken into consideration in the case of 
multivalued dependencies. If the insider is familiar with the multivalued dependencies as well as 
the constraints, accessing some records in a table that has a multivalued dependency does not 
provide any new information to the insider. Meanwhile, if the insider is not familiar with the 
constraints of the multivalued dependency, the access of the insider to some records gives 
him/her exact knowledge about other records in that table. For instance, if an insider knows that 
every employee is working on the projects M and N, as shown in Figure 4.3, accessing the 
records of an employee does not reveal any new information about other employees. Since we 
assume that insiders are familiar with the dependencies as well as the related constraints, we will 
not consider this case as an inference problem. 
 
An insider can also use a combination of accessed attributes to infer information. That is, the 
variable X in the INFER function could be a set of attributes. In this case, the insider can use all 
attributes in X together to infer information about Y. The modified version of the INFER function 
[Morgenstern87] is:  
INFER ({x1,..,xn}y)=(H(y)-Hx1,..,xn(y))/H(y)              (2) 
 Emp Project 
t1 A M 
t2 A N 
t3 B M 
t4 B N 
 Figure 4.3 Multivalued Dependency 
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For instance, in the example of Figure 4.3, suppose that an insider has access to the “Due date” 
attribute in addition to the “Project type” attribute. Then the amount of information that can be 
inferred is computed as following: 
INFER ({project type, due date}  project name) =     (H(project_name)-Hproject-type,due-
date(project_name) /H(project_ name) =100%. 
 
The inference that has been discussed so far is direct inference. However, insiders can infer 
knowledge transitively using transitive dependencies (Definition 7), which is called transitive 
inference and is defined as follows:  
 
Definition 20 (Transitive Inference).  Given a transitive dependency A  B  C in a relational 
database D, where A, B, and C are data items in D, the knowledge an insider infers about C by 
accessing A is called transitive inference. 
 
4.2.2 Computed Knowledge  
Computed knowledge is similar to inferred knowledge except that it is acquired through 
computation. Formally, the computed knowledge is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 21 (Computed Knowledge).  Given a dependency A  B in a relational database, 
where  A and B are data items, the knowledge an insider gets about B through computation by 
using A is called computed knowledge. 
For example, consider the dependency between the Rank attribute and the Total_Salary attribute 
in Figure 4.4. Suppose that the range of total salaries of academic staff is between 65k and 130k, 
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and there are three ranks for academic staff, which are known to insiders. In addition, suppose 
that the Total_Salary of an academic staff is computed as follows: Total_Salary = Base_Salary + 
500 * experience, where Base_Salary is the left side of the ranges of Total_Salary. If an insider 
has an access to the Rank attribute, the amount of information he/she can infer about the 
Total_Salary of any academic staff is either 80 % or 61.5% because Total_Salary intervals are 
not equally likely. If the insider has an access to the Rank attribute and the Experience of an 
academic staff, the information he/she  can  acquire about the Total_Salary attribute is 100% 
(exact knowledge), which is computed as shown.  
 
INFER({Rank, Experience}Total_Salary) = (H (Total_Salary)- Hrank,experience(Total_ Salary)) / 
H(Total_Salary) =100%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above computation is based on the assumption that the left side of a Total_Salary interval is 
the Base_Salary of an academic staff without any experience, and the right side is the maximum 
total salary an academic staff (with respect to the corresponding Rank) can get.             
Rank Total_Salary 
Assistant Prof 65k-90k 
Associate Prof 91k-116k 
Full Prof 117k-130k 
Figure 4.4. Rank  Total_Salary Dependency 
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4.2.3 Aggregated knowledge 
Aggregated knowledge is the knowledge that results from combining two or more data items. It 
may be called composite knowledge or combined knowledge as well. Formally, the aggregated 
knowledge is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 22 (Aggregated Knowledge).  Given two related data items A and B in a relational 
database, the knowledge achieved by combing A and B together is called aggregated knowledge. 
 
An insider may have direct access to basic knowledge units (attributes or virtual knowledge 
units) or aggregated knowledge units. To show how aggregated knowledge could be a threat, 
consider the following example. Suppose that the relation R(Name, Rank, Salary) is a relational 
schema and the knowledge units Name, Rank and Salary can be accessed separately by an 
insider. Similarly, the aggregated knowledge [Name, Rank] or [Rank, Salary] can be accessed 
separately by the insider, but the insider should not get access to the aggregated knowledge 
[Name, Salary], which is unauthorized information to the insider. Obviously, using the two 
aggregated knowledge [Name, Rank] and [Rank, Salary] and the dependency between the two 
attributes Rank and Salary, the insider obtains the aggregated knowledge [Name, Salary], which 
is considered a threat [Brodsky00].  
 
Figure 4.5 shows an example of how aggregated knowledge is constructed, where KU indicates a 
knowledge unit and AK indicates an aggregated knowledge unit. Aggregated knowledge can be 
gained using dependencies and the transitivity property. Therefore, in case of the  dependency  
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ABC, if an insider has access to data item A, he/she can get the aggregated  knowledge  
[A,B],  [B,C] and  [A,C]. Formally, an insider R can aggregate knowledge as follows. 
(ABC) ∧ Access(R,A)  Access(R,[A,B]) ∧ Access(R,[B,C]) ∧ Access(R,[A,C]) 
 
Where Access (R, [A,B]) means that an insider R has access to the aggregated knowledge [A,B].  
 
The knowledge that can be acquired by an insider, but not stored in the database, is called virtual 
knowledge [Morgenstern87]. Thus, an insider can have two types of knowledge: stored 
knowledge, which is stored in the database, and virtual knowledge. 
 
The term “data item” may represent an attribute, a record, or a table. Dependencies between 
tables or records occur due to dependencies between attributes in those tables or records.  Thus, 
in this work, the discussion about knowledge or a dependency relationship at a lower level of 
granularity (attribute level) is applicable for other levels to granularity. However, in the next 
sections, we use the term “data item” to indicate a basic knowledge unit (a stored basic 
knowledge unit, which is an attribute, or a virtual basic knowledge unit).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KU11 
AK3 
KU12 KU21 
Data Item 1 Data Item 2 
AK1 
AK2 
            Figure 4.5 Aggregated Knowledge 
 
40 
 
Based on the concepts of knowledge acquisition and Figure 3.1, Figure 4.6 demonstrates how an 
insider broadens his/her knowledge using his/her access privileges, and dependencies and 
constraints. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Neural Dependency and Inference Graph 
A dependency graph can be used to show dependencies among different data items in a relational 
database system [Althebyan07]. In addition to CDG, this dissertation introduces another type of 
dependency graphs called the Neural Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG). An NDIG 
represents dependencies among data items in relational databases, the amount of knowledge that 
can be acquired from/by accessing a single data item about other data items, and the amount of 
Insider 
Rank Experience # of dependents 
HI_Premium 
Direct Access 
Direct Access 
Infer 
Compute 
Infer 
Direct Access 
[Name, 
Dependents, 
Rank, 
Experience] 
Direct Access 
Name 
Direct Access 
Base_Salary 
Total_Salary 
Compute 
Tax 
Direct Access 
Net_Salary 
Compute 
Compute 
Compute 
[Name, Rank, Dependents, Experience, Base_Salary, Net_Salary,Total_Salary, 
Health_ Insurance] 
 
Aggregate 
Aggregate 
Aggregate 
Aggregate 
Aggregate 
Figure 4.6 Acquiring knowledge 
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knowledge that can be deduced from/by accessing a group of data items about other data items. 
The NDIG is defined formally as follows: 
 
Definition 23 (NDIG). The Neural Dependency and Inference Graph NDIG (O,N,W,E) is a 
graph that shows dependencies among data items and the amount of information that can be 
acquired about  data items using dependencies, where: 
1. O represents data items, which are demonstrated by rectangles. 
2. N indicates neurons, which are represented by ellipses. 
3. W indicates weights on edges. 
4. E indicates edges, which represent dependencies among data items such that: 
a. The edges E(Oi, Nk) and E(Nk, Oj) indicate that the data item Oj depends on the data item 
Oi. 
b. The weight on the edge E(Oi, Nk) represents the amount of information that can be 
acquired about the data item Oj using the data item Oi. 
c. The weight on the edge E(Nk, Oj) represents the amount of information that can be 
acquired about the data item Oj using all data items {O1…Ox} together, such that      
  
E(Os, Nk) ∈ E. 
 
 An example of NDIG is shown in Figure 4.7. NDIG uses some ideas from artificial neural 
networks, where rectangles represent data items (input or output data items), elliptical nodes 
represent neurons, and weights on edges represent inputs to neurons or output from neurons. 
Each neuron consists of the function INFER and a weight. The weight, which is the output, 
represents the amount of information that can be inferred about the output data items using the 
input data items. Obviously, the INFER function is used to compute weights in  neurons.  Solid 
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lines show that there is a dependency between input and output data items, which indicates that 
output data items depend on input data items. Dashed lines represent cyclic inference, which was 
discussed earlier. For instance, as shown in Figure 4.7, O5 depends on O1 and O2. The weight 
11% on the edge e(O1, n3) means that an insider who accesses O1 can acquire about 11% of 
knowledge about O5. Furthermore, the weight 78% on the edge e(n3 ,O5)  means that an insider 
who accesses both O1 and O2 can infer about 78% of knowledge about O5.   
 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates the NDIG of the academic staff database that is shown in Figure 3.1. As 
shown, the amount of knowledge that can be acquired about the Net_Salary using the Tax table 
only is 0%. As assumed, some insiders may already know dependencies and constraints. Thus, 
accessing the Tax table does not reduce the uncertainty of the Net_ Salary for them. Similarly, 
using the HI_Premium (Health_Insurance_Premium) value only provides negligible information  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Neural Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG) 
 O1 
 O2 
 O3 
n3  O5 
11%  
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  O4 
78%  
 
 
78%  
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n4 
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n5 
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100%  
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12%  
 
 
7%  
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since it does not reduce the uncertainty of the Net_Salary. To clarify this point, suppose that 
possible minimum and maximum values of Total_Salary based on Figure 4.4 are $65000 and 
$130000 respectively. The range of Net_Salary without knowing HI_Premium is [65000 - Tax, 
130000 - Tax]. The range of values of Net_Salary given HI_Premium is [65000 - HI_Premium - 
Tax, 13000 – HI_Premium - Tax], which does not reduce the uncertainty of Net_Salary. Thus, 
the edge that connects both knowledge units is labeled with 0% as shown in Figure 4.8.    
 
However, the insider who accesses the Total_Salary of an employee gets a huge amount of 
information about the Net_Salary of the employee. Obviously, the insider can use Total_Salary 
in conjunction with his/her knowledge about Tax table to get information about the Net_Salary 
of the employee. Strictly speaking, he/she can get a reduced range of the Net_Salary of the 
employee. Using these criteria, the amount of information the insider can acquire about the 
Net_Salary ranges between 98% and 99%, which is based on the assumption that the maximum 
Figure 4.8 NDIG for the Academic Staff Database 
 
n1 
 
100% 100% 
100% 0%  
0%  
100% 100% 
100% 100% 
100% 
0% 
61.5% or 80% 
  100% 100% 
 Rank 
 Experience 
n3 
 
n4 
 
 HI_Premium n6 
 
 
 Total_Salary  Base_Salary n2 
 
 Tax Table 
98% to 99% 
n5 
 
 # of dependents 
 Net_Salary 
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HI_Premium is 1000. However, the insider can acquire the exact knowledge about the 
Net_Salary of an employee if he/she knows exactly the HI_Premium and the Total_Salary 
values. To make the NDIG in Figure 4.7 simpler, we have omitted most cyclic inference lines.  
 
4.4 Insiders' Knowledgebases  
 
A knowledgebase determines which data items the corresponding insider has read. That is, it is a 
profile of insider accesses to data items. This section demonstrates how to build up the 
knowledgebases of insiders at different levels of granularities. The dissertation defines 
knowledgebase as follows. 
 
Definition 24 (Knowledgebase). Given an insider R and a relational database RDB, the 
knowledgebase of R, written as KB(R),  is the set of data items in RDB that R has accessed using 
his/her privileges, and the data items about which R can acquire information using dependencies 
and constraints. 
 
Based on the concepts of Hot and Safe Clusters in section 3.2, the following observations are 
made. First, if an insider gets read access to a table that belongs to a Hot Cluster, s/he can acquire 
information about all other tables in that cluster. Secondly, if an insider gets read access to a 
table in a Safe Cluster, s/he cannot infer any information about any other table that belongs to the 
same cluster (without accessing them directly). Finally, if an insider gets read access to a table in 
some cluster, s/he still may infer information about other dependent tables that belong to 
different clusters. The latter case would occur when the dependency between them is One-Way 
dependency.  
In addition to the above conclusions, an insider can acquire information transitively about other 
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tables using the transitive dependencies among attributes as follows. Suppose that a relational 
database has the following dependency:  T1  T2 … Tn-1  Tn, where T1 to Tn are tables in the 
database. The insider who has a read access to Tk (1 ≤ k ≤ n-2) can infer information about Tj 
transitively (transitive inference), where j ranges from k+2 to n, if the dependencies between the 
tables Tk to Tj are between attributes in the form Ck  Ck+1  Ck+2 … Cn-2  Cn-1  Cn  such 
that     
 Cx ∈ Tx. Obviously, a transitive dependency is formed by a sequence of connected 
direct dependencies. Notice that the condition imposes the continuity of the dependencies 
between tables. Strictly speaking, the destination attribute (right side) in a direct dependency is 
the source attribute (left side) for the next direct dependency. Hence, the insider who has access 
to Tn can infer information about predecessors in the chain in the same way (cyclic inference). 
 
The existence of inferable tables in the knowledgebase of an insider does not necessarily mean 
that the insider can infer all information about those tables. To reveal more details, dependencies 
and constraints between attributes in those tables should be investigated. To perform this, the 
dependency graph CDG is used. For instance, in Figure 3.3, suppose that an insider has full read 
and write access on table T1. Then, both tables T1 and T2 are added to the knowledgebase of the 
insider since they have a dependency relationship. The insider knows all information about T1, 
whereas his/her information about T2 is limited by the dependency between the two tables. To 
clarify what information the insider can infer about T2, dependencies between attributes in both 
tables should be investigated. Clearly, s/he infers information about a4 and a6, and acquires 
information about a5 by cyclic inference. However, s/he does not have information about other 
attributes in T2. To compute how much information the insider has about specific attributes, the 
corresponding NDIG is used. 
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A similar scenario is used at the records level. If the insider has read a record, then the record is 
added to his/her knowledgebase. In addition, other records that depend on this record are added 
to. But this does not mean that s/he has full information about the latter records. To determine 
what information the insider has about those records, the dependencies among attributes should 
be investigated. 
 
4.4.1 Knowledgebase Algorithm 
Algorithm 4.1 shows how to build a knowledge graph, which represents knowledgebases at 
different levels of granularity. It uses the NDIG and the CDG of the corresponding relational 
database as well as the Dependency Matrix. In addition, it uses Hot and Safe clusters to facilitate 
construction of the knowledge graph. 
 
The algorithm starts by adding the insider as the root of a knowledge graph. The second level of 
the graph contains the tables about which the insider has information (by direct access or by 
inference). For each table at the second level, the algorithm determines which attributes the 
insider has information of (by direct access or by inference). The NDIG is used to label edges by 
the amount of information the insider can have about each data item (attribute or table). Either 
the NDIG or the CDG is used to show dependencies between knowledge units (attributes), where 
dependencies are represented by an edge (arrow) from the source attribute (left side of a 
dependency) to the destination (dependent) attribute. Moreover, the CDG is used to show what 
values of attributes are stored in the insider’s knowledgebase, which is used in insider threat 
prediction and prevention later in section 4.5. Notice that the amount of information the insider 
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has about a table is the average of all information s/he has about all attributes that belong to the 
table.  
 
 
Algorithm 4.1. Knowledgebase Algorithm 
 
Input: An insider I, Dependency Matrix, CDG, NDIG, Hot and Safe clusters, S: Set of tables to which   
             the insider has direct read access. 
Output: The knowledge graph of the insider I. 
 
1. Initialize the KG = (V,E), where V = {I}, E={}. 
2. For each table Tk in S //add directly accessed tables 
3.    V=V ∪ Tk // add the node Tk to KG  
4.    E=E ∪ {e(I, Tk)} // add the edge e(I, Tk) to the KG 
5.    For each t ∈ attributes(Tk) and the insider has a read access to it // add directly accessed attributes 
6.       V=V ∪ {t} // add the attribute t to KG  
7.       E=E ∪ {e(Tk, t)} // add edge e(Tk, t) to the KG 
8.    Endfor 
9. Endfor 
10. For each Tk in S do // consider dependencies 
11.    For each Safe Cluster R to which Tk belongs 
12.        X ∈ R ∧ X ∉ D  X ∉ KB(I) //exclude X from KG   
13.  Endfor 
14.    For each Hot Cluster H to which Tk belongs 
15.       For  Tm ∈ H ∧ Tm ≠ Tk 
16.          V = V ∪ {Tm}// add the node Tm to KG  
17.          E = E ∪ {e(I, Tm)} // add edge e(I, Tm) to the KG 
18.          For each tm ∈ attributes(Tm)  ∧ tk  tm, where tk ∈ attributes(Tk) // add directly inferred attribute(s)                                                                                                                                        
         to the  KG      
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19.              V = V ∪ { tm } // add the attribute tm to KG 
20.              E = E ∪ { e(Tm, tm)} // add e(Tm, tm) to KG 
21.              E = E ∪ { e(tk, tm) } //   add e(tk, tm) to KG                                                                                                                               
22.          Endfor 
23.       Endfor 
24.    Endfor 
25.    For each other table Ts that has dependency (one_way) with Tk // add tables from other clusters 
26.        Repeat steps 16 to 22 for the table Ts 
27.    Endfor 
28.    For each table Tj that depends transitively on Tk (Definition 20) // transitive inference 
29.        V=V ∪ { Tj } //add the node Ts to KG 
30.        E=E ∪ {e(I, Tj)} // add edge e(I, Tj) to the KG  
31.        For each tj ∈ attributes(Tj) ∧ tk    tj (transitive inference), where tk ∈ attributes(Tk) //add the transitively  
inferred attribute(s) to the KG 
 
32.          V=V ∪ { tj } // add the attribute t j to KG 
33.          E=E ∪ {e(Tj, t j)} // add edge e(Tj, t j) to the KG 
34.          E= E ∪ {e(tk, t j)} // add edge e(tk, t j) to the KG 
35.        Endfor 
36.    Endfor 
37. Endfor 
38. For each edge e(T,t) // T is a table and t is an Attribute 
39.    Weight (e(T,t)) =  the amount of information the insider has about t // using NDIG 
40. Endfor 
41. For each edge e(I,T) // weight of tables 
42.    Weight(e(I,T) ) = ∑                
 
      , where n is the number of attributes in Tz. 
43. Endfor 
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To clarify how this algorithm works, suppose that the corresponding NDIG for the CDG in 
Figure 3.3 is as shown in Figure 4.9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Let the insider have read T1. In this case, Figure 4.10 shows the KG of the insider based on the 
algorithm. Solid arrows point to data items to which the insider has direct access, whereas dotted 
arrows point to data items about which the insider can infer information. Dashed arrows 
represent the paths the insider follows to infer information. For instance, the insider acquires 
information about the attribute a2 using direct access, whereas s/he gets information about a6 by 
inference using the attribute a2. Weights on edges show the amount of information the insider 
can have about the destination data items. The weight on edges between the root and a table is 
the average value of weights on the edges between the table and its corresponding attributes. 
Notice that these values are based on the assumption that the tables do not have any other 
attributes other than what are shown. 
Figure 4.9. The NDIG of the Database in Figure 3.3 
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4.4.2 Proof of Correctness of Algorithm 4.1 
 
Insiders can get knowledge in different ways. First, they can get knowledge directly using their 
privileges. Second, they can infer knowledge directly (using direct dependencies). Finally, they 
can acquire knowledge transitively (using transitive dependencies). The following theorems 
prove that the algorithm considers all these ways when building knowledge graphs. 
 
Theorem 1. Given a table B in a relational database DB, and the knowledge graph KG of an 
insider I, 
B ∈ KG ⇔ B ∈ D (I) ∨ B ∈ DD(A) ∨ B ∈ TD(A)  
where D(I) is the set of tables to which the insider has direct access, DD(A) and TD(A) are the 
set of tables that depend directly or transitively on a table A respectively, and A ∈ D(I).  
 
The theorem lists the three ways which insiders follow to get knowledge. The following proof 
proves that the algorithm adds every table about which the insider may get knowledge using 
those ways. 
 
100% 
Figure 4.10. The Knowledge Graph KG of an Insider 
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Proof: 
() Suppose that A ∈ D (I), and DB has the following dependencies: 
- AB (direct dependency). 
- A    C (transitive dependency).  
It is obvious that A ∈ KG by steps 2 to 4, which add every directly accessed table to the 
knowledge graph. This proves the part of directly accessed tables. In the case of table B, let H(A) 
be a Hot Cluster that  contains A. Now, since A  B, then either B ∈ H(A) (A and B have a 
cyclic dependency), or B ∉ H(A). In the first case, B ∈ KG by steps 14 to 17. In the second case, 
B ∈ KG by steps 25 to 27, which proves the  part of directly dependent tables. In the case of C, 
where C depends transitively on A, C ∈ KG by steps 28 to 30, which proves the part of 
transitively dependent tables. In summary, all tables about which the insider can get knowledge 
are added to the knowledge graph.  
 
() (Proof by Contradiction) This part proves that no other table is added to the knowledge 
graph of the insider. Suppose that ∃B ∈ KG: (B ∉  D(I)  ∧  B ∉  DD(A) ∧  B ∉  TD(A)), where A 
∈ D(I). In this case, B should exist in a Safe Cluster. Thus, B ∉ KG by steps 11 to 13, which is a 
contradiction.   
 
As discussed earlier, the existence of a table in the knowledge graph of an insider does not mean 
that the insider has knowledge about every attribute in that table. The following theorem clarifies 
this point.  
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Theorem 2. Given an attribute k, where k ∈ B for some table B in a relational database DB, and 
the knowledge graph KG of an insider I:  
k ∈ KG ⇔ (k ∈ DA(I) ∨  k ∈ DDA(s) ∨  k ∈ TDA(s)) 
where DA(I) is the set of attributes to which the insider has direct access, DDA(s) and TDA(s) 
are the set of attributes that depends directly or transitively on an attribute s respectively, and s 
∈ DA(I). 
 
The theorem states that an attribute belongs to the KG of an insider if and only if it is accessed 
directly, inferred directly or inferred transitively by the insider. The following proof proves the 
correctness of Theorem 2. 
 
Proof: 
() Suppose that the DB has the following dependencies: 
- A  B ... T, where A, B and T, etc. are tables in DB. 
- k  r ...  z, where k, r and z etc. are attributes such that k ∈ A, r ∈ B and z ∈ T , and k ∈ 
DA(I) and  A ∈ D(I). 
 
First, steps 5 to 8 state that   k: ( k ∈ DA(I) : ( k ∈ A  ∧  A ∈ D(I) ) )  k ∈ KG. This proves the 
part of directly accessed attributes. Second, steps 18 to 22 state that   r: ( r ∈ DDA(k) : ( k ∈ A ∧  
A ∈ D(I) ∧  r ∈ B ∧  B ∈  DD(A) ) )  r ∈ KG. This proves the part of directly dependent 
attributes. Finally, steps 31 to 35 state that   z: ( z ∈ TDA(k) : ( k ∈ A ∧  A ∈ D(I) ∧  z ∈ T ∧  T 
∈ TD(A) ) )  z ∈ KG. This proves the third case.     
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( ) (Proof by Contradiction) Suppose that ∃k ∈ KG: (k ∉  DA(I) ∧  k ∉  DDA(s) ∧  k ∉ 
TDA(s)), where s ∈ DA (I). In this case, there are four cases:  
 
1. k ∈ A , where A ∈ D(I) but k ∉   DA(I). In this case, k is excluded (not added) using steps 5 
to 8. 
2. k ∈ B , where B ∈ DD(A) but k ∉  DDA(s) for some A ∈ D(I) and s ∈ DA (I). In this case, k 
is excluded using steps 18 to 22.  
3. k ∈ T , where T ∈ TD(A) but k ∉ TDA(s) for some A ∈ D(I) and s ∈ DA(I). In this case, k is 
excluded using steps 31 to 35.   
4. k ∈ A and A ∈ S(P), where S(P) is a Safe Cluster of a table P about which the insider has 
knowledge. In this case, k is excluded using steps 11 to 13. 
 
Obviously, all mentioned cases contradict the assumption.   
 
4.5 Insider Threat Prediction and Prevention 
As discussed earlier in previous sections, insiders can use their read access privileges, 
dependencies and constraints to acquire information about unauthorized data items. In addition, 
data items in a knowledgebase could be risky. This section introduces the role of a 
knowledgebase and the life times of data items in insider threat situation. Moreover, it introduces 
the proposed models for insider threat prediction and prevention. 
   
4.5.1 The Role of Knowledgebase and Lifetimes of Data items in Insider Threat 
The values of data items in the knowledgebase of an insider may be combined with some 
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insensitive data items that the insider may request to infer sensitive information, which poses a 
threat [Yaseen09][Yaseen10b]. Revoking read accesses from previously accessed data items 
does not eliminate the threat since the values still exist in the insider’s knowledgebase. For 
instance, consider the dependency ( {Rank, Experience}  Total_Salary ). If the insider has 
accessed the Rank attribute (which is added to his/her knowledgebase) and then he/she is given a 
read access to the Experience attribute, he/she can combine both data items to infer the value of 
the Total_Salary attribute, which could be sensitive information. 
 
Clearly, an insider’s knowledgebase could pose a serious threat, but not if the data items in the 
knowledgebase are expired. That is, if other insiders modify the data items, the lifetimes of those 
data items (old values) may expire. Thus, using them to infer sensitive information would not 
pose a threat. In light of this, considering the lifetime of data items in an insider’s knowledgebase 
is important. However, merely updating values of data items does not always make their 
lifetimes expire. Changing the value of an attribute that belongs to a Strong Dependency makes it 
expire. However, it may or may not expire if the attribute belongs to a Weak Dependency. To 
clarify this point, consider the Strong Dependency (Rank  Base_Salary). In addition, assume 
that an insider, say K, has the information (Jiff, Assistant Professor) in his/her knowledgebase 
about the professor Jiff. In this case, K can infer exact information about the Base_Salary of Jiff. 
However, changing the Rank attribute of Jiff by other insiders must change the Base_Salary of 
Jiff. In this case, the Rank value in K’s knowledgebase is expired. That is, if K uses it to infer the 
Base_Salary of Jiff, K’s inference will be incorrect.  
 
On the other hand, consider the Weak Dependency (Score  Grade) in a student table. A change 
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in the Score attribute does not always make a change in the Grade attribute. That is, changing 
Score does not always make the old value of Score expire. To clarify this point, suppose that the 
insider has read a student’s score, say 85, which enables him/her to infer the student’s grade ( B 
in this case) . However, suppose that the student’s score has been updated to 88 and the insider is 
prevented from accessing the student’s score again. In this case, the insider still infers the correct 
value of the student’s grade based on the old value of the student’s score. We say in this case that 
the old value of the student’s score in the insider’s knowledgebase has not expired although it 
has been updated. However, if the Score value is changed to 91, which will change the Grade to 
A, the old value of Score will expire since the inference based on it is incorrect. The concept 
“Expired data item” is defined as follows.  
 
Definition 25 (Expired Data Items). Given the data items A and B in a relational database DB 
and the dependency A  B, A is called an expired data item if its value is updated to a new value 
such that the inferred information about B based on A’s old value is incorrect.  
 
Checking the lifetimes of data items has a great impact on insider threat prevention and on the 
performance of systems. For example, suppose that a security protocol denied the request of an 
insider to access a data item (X) because s/he may combine it with a data item R in his/her 
knowledgebase to infer some unauthorized information. However, if the value of data item R has 
expired, the system unnecessarily denied the access to X since providing the value of X would 
not create a problem; rather by denying access to X, stops the user from performing his/her job 
on a timely basis. Similarly, ignoring the knowledgebase and granting access irrespective of the 
history of previous accesses and data item’s lifetime may pose a threat. Thus, both these issues 
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should be considered when an insider requests accesses to data items. 
 
The work by Farkas et. al [Farkas01] attempted to increase the availability of data items by 
checking the updates history. In their work, each insider has a history file that stores all data 
items, which the insider either has previously received or can disclose from the received data 
items. When an insider launches a query, all data items that can be received from this query are 
stored in the file. The data items that a user can infer are discovered by considering the current 
request, the history file, and the dependencies among data items. Based on the inferred data 
items, the system decides whether to grant or deny the requested data items. However, some data 
items that were accessed in the past may have been updated by others as explained before. 
Therefore, the inferred data items based on those expired data items would be incorrect. We 
should mention here that the researchers in [Farkas01] consider that a knowledge unit is expired 
if it is updated after the last access to it by the user. However, this dissertation states that 
updating the value of a knowledge unit does not always mean that its lifetime is expired. 
Actually, its lifetime is not expired as long as its old value can still make correct inference.  
Hence, their assumption may lead to the disclosure of sensitive data and failure to detect and 
prevent insider threat.  
 
4.5.2 The Proposed Approach  
Constructing the knowledge graph of an insider, which shows his/her knowledgebase, helps in 
predicting and preventing insider threat (disclosure of unauthorized information). This 
dissertation introduces the Threat Prediction Graph (TPG), which is built based on the 
knowledge graph, to predict and prevent this type of insider threat. Before defining the TPG 
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formally, let us introduce the Threat Prediction Value (TPV). A TPV is a value stored in each 
attribute that belongs to the TPG of the insider, and it is used to predict insider threat. A TPG is 
computed as follows.  
TPV(k) = F(k) / T(k)                       (3) 
 
where k is an attribute, F(k) is the amount of information the insider has about k, and T(k) is the 
threshold value of k according to the insider. T(k) represents the amount of information that the 
insider is allowed to get about k. TPG uses TPV to detect and prevent insider threat. An attribute 
is considered a threat if its TPV is greater than 1, which means that the insider can get more 
information than allowed about the attribute. TPG is defined as follows. 
 
Definition 26 (TPG). The Threat Prediction Graph  (V, E, L) is a graph that is used to predict 
and prevent insider threat, where: 
1. V indicates nodes such that: 
- The insider node represents the corresponding insider. 
- The second level of nodes (with labels Ti inside) represents the tables about which the 
insider has knowledge (tables' nodes). 
- The third level of nodes (with labels ai inside) is the attributes about which the insider 
has knowledge (attributes' nodes).  
2. E indicates the edges such that: 
- Dashed edges (arrows) represent the paths the insider follows to get knowledge about 
destination data items (tables or attributes).  
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- Solid edges (arrows) point to destination objects (tables or insider nodes) to which 
source data items (tables or attributes) belong. 
3. L represents the TPV values of attributes’ nodes. 
 Figure 4.10 shows an instance of a TPG. The following points should be taken into account 
when analyzing a TPG:  
a) A solid arrow from a table node to the insider node ( e(Ti, Insider) ) indicates that the insider 
has information about the table. 
b) A solid arrow from an attribute node to a table node ( e(ai, Ti) ) indicates that the attribute 
belongs to the table. 
c) A dashed arrow from the insider node to a table node ( e(Insider, Ti) ) or from a table node to 
an attribute node (e(Ti, ai)) indicates that the insider has direct read access to those data 
items. 
d) A dashed arrow from an attribute node to another attribute node ( e(ai, aj) )  indicates that the 
first attribute (ai) is used to infer information about the second one (aj).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For instance, in Figure 4.11, the insider has information about the tables T1 (by direct access) and 
T2 (by inference). Similarly, s/he can get information about the attribute a1 by direct access, 
 I 
a1 
Figure 4.11. An Instance of TPG 
 
T1 
 
T2 
0.22 0.63  
a5 
1 
a2 
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however, s/he infers information about a5 and a2 using a1, where a2 belong to T2 and the other 
two attributes belong to T1. The values inside the attributes nodes represent the TPV for those 
attributes. To construct a TPG, NDIG, the KG and the set of threshold values according to the 
underlying insider are used. The threshold value of an attribute according to an insider represents 
the percentage amount of information that the insider is allowed to get about the data item, where 
100% indicates that the insider can get full information about the corresponding data item, and a 
value less than 100% indicates that the insider can get partial information. As discussed earlier, 
the amount of information that an insider gets about a data item is retrieved using NDIG. 
 
 
4.5.2.1 The Algorithm for Insider Threat Prediction and Prevention 
 
Algorithm 2 shows how to detect and prevent insider threat using TPG. The algorithm uses 
NDIG and KG to build the TPG. Moreover, it uses the threshold values for data items according 
to the corresponding insider to compute TPVs.  
 
Algorithm 4.2. Insider Threat Prediction and Prevention 
Input: An insider I, the set of threshold values according to the insider, NDIG, the knowledge    
            graph KG  of the insider. 
Output: The Threat Prediction Graph TPG of the insider I. 
1. Initialize the set of pairs T ={(KU,TKU)}, where TKU is the threshold value about a knowledge unit  KU 
according to the insider I, an empty set S={} 
2. Recall the KG of the insider and the NDIG, initialize the TPG as TPG = KG, but without labels 
3. For each KU ∈ V // knowledge unit  
4.     TPV(KU) = F(KU) / T(KU) //compute the TPV of KU 
5.     KU.TPV = TPV(KU) //store the TPV inside the node 
6. Endfor 
7. For each requested knowledge unit RKU by the insider 
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8.  If TPV(RKU) > 1 //threat predicted 
9.    Deny this request 
10.  Else  //add RKU temporarily for further inspection 
11.    V = V ∪ {Tk}, where RKU ∈ Tk // add table Tk, where Tk  ∉ TPG   
12.    E = E ∪ {e(I, Tk)} //add an edge if e(I, Tk) ∉ E  
13.    V = V ∪ {RKU} // add a node for RKU 
14.    E = E ∪ {Tk, RKU} //add an edge to the TPG 
15.    RKU.TPV = TPV(RKU) // Store the TPV(RKU) inside its node 
16.    For each knowledge unit KUx that has a dependency with RKU //add inferred attributes 
17.       If TPV(KUx) > 1 // threat predicted 
18.          Deny RKU and remove it from TPG 
19.       Else // no threat so far, still needs further inspection 
20.            If KUx ∉ V // not in the TPG 
21.                If KUx and RKU are not in the same table 
22.                     Repeat steps 11 to 15 for KUx //add inferred attributes 
23.                     Add KUx to the set S // for further inspection (step 37) 
24.                Else 
25.                     V = V ∪ {KUx} // Add a node for KUx 
26.                     E=E ∪ {e(RKU, KUx )} // add an edge 
27.                     KUx.TPV = TPV(KUx) // Store the TPV(KUx ) inside its node 
28.                     Add KUx to the set S // for further inspection step37 
29.                Endif 
30.            Else // KUx  ∈  V,  already in the TPG 
31.                Add KUx to the set S // for further inspection step37 
32.                E=E ∪ {e(RKU, KUx )} // add an edge 
33.                Update the TPV of KUx // re-calculate its TPV 
34.            Endif 
35.       Endif 
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36.    Endfor 
37.    For each KU in S 
38.         If  TPV(KU) > 1  // threat predicted  
             Two solutions: // threat prevention 
39.              First: Allow RKU but revoke insiders’ accesses to a knowledge unit(s), say KUz, that has   
                            the following properties: 
(a). KUz already exists in the knowledgebase of the insider. 
(b). KUz can be used in conjunction with RKU to compromise the unauthorized          
        information about KU.  
(c). The lifetime of KUz is expired. 
(d)  Revoking access to KUz preserves the security of all attributes.  
                    OR: //If the first solution is not possible 
40.              Second: Deny the insider’s request to RKU and recover the TPG as it was before step 7.  
41.   Endif 
42.     Endfor 
43.   Endif 
44.Endfor 
 
The algorithm works as follows. First, it initializes the TPG to the KG of the corresponding 
insider (step 2). Next, it computes the TPV for each attribute in TPG and stores the value in the 
attribute’s node (steps 3-6). When an insider requests an access to a data item, say RKU, the 
algorithm checks whether the TPV of RKU is greater than 1. If TPV(RKU) > 1, the request is 
denied (steps 8-9). Similarly, the request is denied if RKU can be used alone to infer 
unauthorized information (steps 17-18). Otherwise, RKU and all data items dependent on RKU 
are added temporarily to the TPG (19-34). These data items are inspected further by the 
algorithm later in the following steps.   
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Before going further, we should mention here that the TPV of all data items in the TPG are 
recalculated after adding RKU. This is because RKU and some data items in the knowledgebase 
(in the TPG) of the insider may be combined to get more information about other data items. 
Thus, the algorithm checks if RKU can be combined with a data item(s) in the insider's 
knowledgebase to make the TPV of other data item(s), say KUj , greater than 1, which indicates 
a threat. To prevent this threat, the algorithm introduces two solutions to solve this problem. The 
first solution is to deny the insider’s request (RKU). The second one is to grant the insider an 
access to RKU, but to revoke access(es) to a data item(s), say KUz, that can be combined with 
RKU to pose the threat (unauthorized information about KUj). KUz should have the following 
properties. First, it already exists in the knowledgebase of the insider. Second, it can be used in 
conjunction with RKU to compromise unauthorized information about KUj. Third, its life time is 
expired. Finally, revoking access to it preserves the security of all attributes. Both solutions 
prevent insider threat; however, the second solution preserves the availability of the data items 
needed to execute the insiders' tasks. Thus, the second solution should be considered first, if it is 
possible. Otherwise, the second solution is used. 
 
The second solution states that when a data item (KUz) is expired, the inference based on it is 
incorrect. In this case, if the insider uses the old (expired) value of KUz, which exists in his 
knowledgebase, and combines it with RKU to infer unauthorized information, his/her inference 
would be incorrect. Moreover, if the insider tries to re-read the new value of KUz to use it in 
inference, his/her attempt is denied since s/he does not have permission anymore to access KUz.  
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4.5.2.2 The Proof of Correctness of Algorithm 4.2 
 
The following lemmas and theorem prove that the algorithm predicts and prevents insider threat. 
Lemma 1. Consider RKU, T(RKU) and F(RKU) as stated in the algorithm, then: 
  RKU: (T(RKU) < F(RKU))  Deny(RKU) 
where Deny (RKU) means that access request for RKU is not granted. 
 
Proof: 
The proof of this lemma is fairly straight forward. Obviously, steps 8-9 states that a requested 
attribute is not granted if the insider can get more information than allowed about it (greater than 
the threshold value). 
 
Lemma 2. Consider KU, TPG, KG and insider I as stated in the algorithm, then: 
KU ∈ KG(I)  KU ∈ TPG(I). 
Proof:  
The lemma states that every attribute about which the insider has knowledge is added to the 
TPG. This is obvious in step 2, which states that the TPG is initialized to the knowledge graph of 
the insider. Thus, since the knowledge graph contains all attributes about which the insider has 
knowledge, as proved in Theorem 1, the initialized TPG contains all those attributes.  
 
Theorem 3. Consider RKU and TPV as stated in the algorithm, then: 
  RKU: Grant(RKU)     t ∈ TPG: TPV(t) ≤ 1,  
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where Grant(RKU) means that RKU is granted. 
 
The theorem states that a requested attribute is granted if the granting preserves the safety of all 
attributes. 
 
Proof: 
Initially, assume that no threat exists. That is, all attributes are safe. Let x represent the requested 
attribute. By lemma 1, if TPV(x) > 1, the request is denied, which prevents the threat and keeps 
all attributes secure. Otherwise, x is granted if for all attributes t in TPG, TPV(t) ≤ 1, which is 
proved as follows. First, x is added to the TPG by steps 11 to 15. Then, the algorithm checks 
what new knowledge the insider can infer using x. This is performed by investigating 
dependencies between x and all other attributes that are already in the knowledgebase of the 
insider. This is easy to accomplish since these attributes are added to the TPG (by lemma 2). 
Next, the algorithm updates the TPVs of the attributes about which the insider may get new (or 
more) knowledge. This is performed by steps 20-33. Then, steps 37-38 check whether any of the 
TPVs is greater than 1 (threat). If a threat is discovered, steps 39-40 suggest two solutions. First, 
deny the insider’s request to access x and recover the state of the TPG to step 7, which is a safe 
state as assumed earlier. Second, allow the insider to access x, but revoke his/her access to other 
attribute(s), such that revoking the access moves the TPG to a new safe state. This proves that 
accessing a data item is allowed if granting it to the corresponding insider preserves the security 
of all data items in the TPG.  
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4.5.2.3 An Example Scenario 
Suppose that Figure 4.12 represents the NDIG of a relational database, where the table T1 
contains the attributes {a1, a5}, the table T2 contains {a2}, and the table T3 contains {a3, a4, a6}. 
Also, assume that the set of attributes to which the corresponding insider has direct access is 
{a1}. Obviously, the knowledgebase of the insider is {(a1, 100%), (a5, 11%), (a2, 5%)}. The 
percentages of values represent the amount of information that the insider has about data items; 
100% indicates exact knowledge and less than 100% means partial knowledge. Notice that the 
amount of knowledge about a2 is acquired by cyclic inference. We should mention here that the 
weights on edges in the graph are the amount of information the insider gets if s/he has exact 
knowledge about source data items (left side of a dependency). Now, assume that T = {(a1, 
100%), (a2, 19%), (a3, 100%), (a4, 100%), (a5, 50%), (a6, 65%)}, where T is the set of threshold 
values for data items according to the given insider. These values indicate the maximum amount 
of information that the corresponding insider is allowed to get about each data item. The 
initialized TPG for this insider is shown in Figure 4.13 (a).  
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Figure 4.12. An NDIG of a Relational Database 
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Now, assume that the insider has requested access to a3. Obviously, granting an access to a3 does 
not form any threat as shown in Figure 4.13 (b) since the TPV will be less than or equal to 1 for 
all attributes when granting a3. Bold dashed arrows demonstrate how the graph would look if the 
requested attribute (a3 in this case) is granted. Notice that the TPV of a4 is 0.35 if the insider has 
exact knowledge about a6 and a4. But since the insider has partial knowledge about a6, the 
assumed value of the TPV is 0.15. Next, suppose that the insider has requested access to a4. 
Obviously, the TPV of a4 is 1, which is legal. However, granting it makes the TPG as shown in 
Figure 4.13 (c). In this TPG, the TPV of a6 is greater than 1, which indicates a threat. In this case, 
the system has two choices. First, the system grants the insider an access to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Predicting and Preventing Insider Threat Using the TPG 
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a4, but revokes his/her access to a3 (if its lifetime is expired). Second, the system denies the 
insider’s request to read a4. If the system chooses the first choice, the TPG of the insider will 
look as shown in Figure 4.13 (d). This option allows the insider to perform his/her task without 
limiting the availability of data items or revealing sensitive information. 
 
4.6  Simulation 
The simulation was performed using MS C#.net and SQL Server. A sample relational database 
of 10 tables was created manually. The dependencies and the NDIG of the database were created 
randomly. Similarly, the threshold values of insiders about data items were created randomly as 
well. The simulation was performed by choosing the number of insiders, the number of 
transactions, and the number of attributes in transactions at each round. The timestamps of 
reading or writing data items was stored to show whether data items are expired in the 
knowledgebases of insiders. Moreover, the amount of information that insiders get about each 
data item was computed and stored using the NDIG of the database. The approach was tested 
according to different parameters to show its effectiveness. The parameters used were the 
number of insiders in the system, the number of transactions, and the percentage of write 
operations in transactions. For the same values of parameters, the simulation was executed 100 
times and the average was taken as the result. We should mention here that all threats were 
prevented either by finding and removing expired data items from knowledgebases or by 
denying read accesses. However, the percentage of prevented threats shown in the figures below 
indicates the number of threats that was prevented by finding and removing expired data items 
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over the total number of threat, which shows the effectiveness of using the proposed approach in 
preventing threat without limiting the availability of data items. 
 
Figure 4.14 shows the results of the simulation with different number of insiders. The number of 
transactions is fixed at 250 at each round. The results show that when the number of transactions 
and the number of insiders are fixed, the performance of the proposed approach improves as the 
percentage of write operations increases. This is due to the fact that when the number of write 
operations increases, the number of expired data items increases as well. Thus, the probability of 
finding an expired data item to prevent a threat using the proposed approach gets higher.  
Contrarily, the figure shows that there is no trend when the number of insiders increases. The 
analysis of this result is as follows. When insiders execute a small number of transactions, the 
data items in their knowledgebases will be few. Fewer data items in an insider's knowledgebase 
leads to two conclusions. First, it means a smaller number of threats is possible by the insider. 
That is, the probability of using data items in knowledgebase to pose a security violation gets 
smaller. Second, it means that there is less probability of finding an expired data item when a 
threat arises since few updates are executed when the number of transactions is small. These two 
opposite effects keep the percentage of prevented threats almost stable in general as the number 
of insiders increases or decreases.  
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Figure 4.15 shows the results of the simulation according to different number of transactions and 
different percentage of write operations, whereas the number of insiders is fixed at 20. The figure 
shows that for the same number of transactions and insiders, the percentage of prevented threat 
by removing risky expired data items increases as the percentage of write operations increases. 
The analysis of this result is similar to that of Figure 4.14. In addition, Figure 4.15 shows that the 
number of prevented threats increases as the number of transactions increases. At first glance, 
this result seems strange since an increase in the number of transactions causes both the number 
of write and read operations to increase. Thus, data items are expired and refreshed quicker when 
executing the transactions. That is, no general trend of the prevented threats should be detected. 
However, this assumption is incorrect as shown in the figure and the reason is as follows. Since 
there are 20 insiders in the system, when an insider refreshes an expired data item in his/her 
knowledgebase by executing read operations, there are 19 other insiders available to update the 
expired data item and make it expire. Thus, the probability of preventing threat by finding and 
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removing expired data items increases. In summary, increasing the number of transactions 
increment the probability of re-reading a data item by an insider, but it greatly increases the 
probability of updating and expiring the data item by other insiders. 
 
The simulation shows that the proposed approach prevents all detected insider threats. Moreover, 
it shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach in preventing insider threats without limiting 
the availability of data items (without denying read access requests). As shown in the figures, the 
percentage of the prevented threats ranges from 8% to 30% depending on the number of 
transactions and the percentage of write operations in transactions. 
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5.   INSIDER THREAT: UNAUTHORIZED MODIFICATIONS ATTACKS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
By discovering constraints on dependencies, an insider may be able to modify a dependent data 
item, to which s/he has no write access, to a desired value by updating the pre-cursor data 
item(s). For instance, consider the dependency {Rank, Experience}  Total_Salary as discussed 
earlier. Assume that an insider has a write access on Rank and Experience, but s/he has no write 
access on Total_Salary. In addition, assume that the insider is familiar with the dependency and 
constraints. In this case, the insider can modify the value of Total_Salary for an academic staff to 
the value s/he prefers, which can be performed by choosing the appropriate values of Rank and 
Experience for the academic staff. This section discusses this problem and suggests possible 
solutions.   
 
5.2 Insiders’ Modification-Lists 
A modification-list determines which data items an insider can modify.  It is constructed based 
on the different levels of granularity of relational databases. Based on the concepts of Hot and 
Safe clusters, the followings are concluded. First, if an insider is granted write access to a table 
that belongs to a Hot Cluster, s/he can make changes in all other tables in that cluster. Second, if 
an insider is given a write access to a table in a Safe Cluster, s/he cannot modify any other table 
(without having direct write access to it) that belongs to the same cluster. Finally, if an insider 
gets write access to a table in some cluster, s/he still can modify other dependent tables that 
belong to different clusters. This case occurs when the dependency between tables is a One_Way  
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dependency. In addition to the above conclusions, an insider can make changes in other tables 
transitively. The modification-list of an insider does not necessarily mean that the insider can 
make arbitrary changes to the associated tables.  To know what changes are possible, 
dependencies among attributes in those tables and associated constraints should be investigated. 
To do this, the dependency graph CDG is used. For instance, suppose that an insider has full 
write access on table T1 as shown in Figure 5.1. Both tables T1 and T2 are added to the 
modification-list of the insider since they have a dependency relationship. The insider can 
change data in T1 as and when s/he wishes, whereas his/her write access to T2 is limited by the 
dependency between the two tables. To determine what changes the insider can make in T2, 
dependencies between attributes in both tables should be investigated. Clearly, s/he can modify 
attributes t4 and t6 only in T2.  
 
Figure 5.1. A Constraint and Dependency Graph CDG 
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A similar scenario is used for items at the records level. If the insider has write access to a 
record, then this record must be in his/her modification-list. In addition, other records that 
depend on this record must be there as well. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the insider can 
change data in all fields in those records. To investigate what information the insider can change, 
dependencies among attributes should be investigated.  
 
5.3 The Modification Algorithm 
Algorithm 5.1 shows how to construct Modification Graphs, which represent modification-lists 
at different levels of granularity. The algorithm uses the CDG and Dependency Matrix to 
construct the modification graphs of insiders. In addition, it uses Hot and Safe clusters to 
facilitate the construction process. A Modification Graph is defined formally as follows. 
 
Definition 27 (MG). The Modification Graph MG (V, E) is a graph that demonstrates the data 
items (tables and attributes) that an insider can modify directly or indirectly in a relational 
database system, where: 
6. V indicates nodes such that: 
- The insider node represents the corresponding insider. 
- The second level of nodes (labeled Ti) represents the tables which the insider can modify 
(Tables’ nodes). 
- The third level of nodes (labeled ai) shows the attributes which the insider can change 
(attributes' nodes).  
7. E indicates the edges such that: 
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- Dashed edges (arrows) represent the paths the insider follows to modify destination data 
items (tables or attributes). 
- Solid edges (arrows) point to destination objects (tables or insider nodes) to which 
source data items (attributes) belong or which the insider can change. 
 
The modification algorithm starts by adding the insider as the root of the modification graph. 
Next, it adds the tables which the insider can change directly or indirectly (using dependencies), 
at the second level. For each table at the second level, the algorithm determines to which 
attributes the insider has a write access (direct or indirect) and inserts them at the third level. 
 
Consider the CDG as shown in Figure 5.1 and assume that the insider has a write access to T1. 
Figure 5.2 shows the modification graph of the insider. Dashed arrows represent the paths that 
the insider follows to make changes. For instance, the insider can modify attribute t2 directly, 
whereas s/he can modify t6 indirectly through t2. 
 
Algorithm 5.1. The Modification Algorithm 
 
Input: An insider I, Dependency Matrix, CDG, Hot and Safe clusters, Set of tables to which the insider has write 
access S. 
Output: The Modification graph MG of the insider I. 
 
1. Initialize the MG = (V,E) , where V={I} and  E={}. 
2. For each table Tk in S //add direct write accessed tables to the graph 
3.     V = V ∪ { Tk } //add the node Tk to MG 
4.     E = E ∪ {e(I, Tk)}  // add edge e(I, Tk) to the MG  
5.     For each attribute t ∊ Tk that the insider has a write access to it // add directly accessed attributes to  the MG 
                                                                                                              
6.         V=V ∪ { t } //add the node t to MG 
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7.         E=E ∪ {e(Tk, t)}// add edge e(Tk, t) to the MG  
8.     Endfor 
9. Endfor 
10. For each Tk in S do // tables in S  
11.    For each Safe Cluster R to which Tk belongs  
12. Exclude all tables in R (that does not belong to S) from the MG of  the insider 
13.    Endfor 
14.    For each Hot Cluster H to which Tk belongs 
15.         For each table Tm ∈ H 
16.              V = V ∪ { Tm }  //add the node Tm to the MG 
17.              E = E ∪ {e(I, Tm)} // add the edge e(I, Tm) to the MG  
18.         Endfor 
19.          For each attribute t ∊ Tm  that the insider can change depending on direct dependencies//add  t to  the MG                                       
                                                                                                                                                         
20.              V= V ∪ { t } //add the node t to MG 
21.              E= E ∪ {e(Tm, t)} //add the edge e(Tm, t) to the MG  
22.              E= E ∪ {e(d, t)}, where d is an attribute that belongs to  Tk and  on which t depends                                       
23.         Endfor 
24.    Endfor 
25.  For each other table Ts that depends (one-way) on Tk//add tables from other clusters  
26.         Repeat steps 15 to 23 for the table Ts 
27.    Endfor 
28.    For each table Tj that depends transitively on Tk (transitive  dependency) // transitive change                                                                                      
29.        V=V ∪ {Tj} //add the node T j  to MG 
30.        E=E ∪ {e(I, Tj)}// add edge e(I, Tj)  to the MG   
31.    Endfor 
32.  For each t ∊ attributes(Tj)  that the insider can  change it transitively (transitive  dependency) //add t 
                                                                                                                                     to the MG                    
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5.4 The Proof of Correctness of Algorithm 5.1 
Insiders can modify data items in different ways. First, they can modify data items using their 
privileges. Second, they can modify data items indirectly using direct dependencies. Finally, they 
can modify data items transitively using transitive dependencies. The following theorems prove 
that Algorithm 5.1 considers all these ways when building modification graphs. We should 
mention here that the proofs are similar to the proofs in Algorithm 4.1. However, Algorithm 5.1 
deals with modification graphs instead of knowledge graphs. 
 
Theorem 1. Given a table B in a relational database DB, and the modification graph MG of an 
insider, then: 
B ∊ MG ⇔ B ∊ D(I) ∨ B ∊ DD(A) ∨ B ∊ TD(A) 
33.        V = V ∪ {t} //add the node t to MG 
34.        E = E ∪ {e(Tj, t)}//add edge e(Tj, t) to the MG  
35.   E = E ∪ {e(f, t)}, where f is an attribute that belongs to a table in MG  and on which t depends directly                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
                                                                                                                                              
36.    Endfor 
37. Endfor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 A Modification Graph of an Insider. 
a2 
T2 
T1 
  I 
a1 a3 a4 a6 
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where D(I) is the set of tables to which the insider has direct write access, the table A ∊ D(I), and 
DD(A) and TD(A) are the set of tables  that depend directly and transitively respectively on A.  
 
The theorem lists the three ways which insiders follow to modify data items. The following 
proof verifies that the algorithm adds all tables which the insider may modify using those ways. 
 
Proof:   
() Suppose that A ∊ D (I) and DB has the following dependencies: 
1) AB, which means that B depends directly on A. 
2) A   C, which means that C depends transitively on A. 
It is obvious that A∊ MG by steps 2 to 4, which add every directly accessed table (write 
access) to the modification graph. This proves the part of directly accessed tables with a write 
privilege. In the case of table B, let H(A) be a Hot Cluster that contains A. Now, since A  B, 
then either B∊ H(A)   (A and B have cyclic dependency), or B ∉ H(A). In the first case, B ∊ MG 
by steps 14 to 18. In the second case, B ∊ MG by steps 25 to 27. This proves the part of directly 
dependent tables. In the case of C, where C depends transitively on A, C ∊ MG by steps 28 to 31. 
This proves the part of transitively dependent tables. In summary, all tables which the insider can 
modify are added to the modification graph. □  
 
() (Proof by Contradiction) This part proves that there is no table added to the modification 
graph of the insider but those added in the previous part. Suppose that ∃B ∊ MG: (B ∉ D(I) ∧ B 
∉ DD(A) ∧ B ∉ TD(A)),where A ∊ D(I). In this case, B should exist in a Safe Cluster (Definition 
8). Thus, B ∉ MG by steps 11 to 13, contradiction.□  
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As discussed earlier, if a table exists in the modification graph of an insider, this does not mean 
that the insider can modify every attribute in that table. The following theorem clarifies this 
claim. 
 
Theorem 2. Given an attribute k, where k ∊ B for some table B in a relational database DB, and 
the modification graph MG of an insider I, we have, 
k ∊ MG ⇔ k ϵ DA(I) ∨ k ∊ DDA(s) ∨ k ∊ TDA(s) 
where DA(I) is the set of attributes to which the insider has direct write access, the attribute s ∊ 
DA(I), DDA(s) and TDA(s) are the set of attributes that depend directly and transitively on  s 
respectively. 
 
Proof:  
() Suppose that DB has the following dependencies: 
1) AB ...  T, where A, B and T are tables in DB, and A ∊ D(I).  
2) k r ...  z, where k, r and z are attributes, and k ∊ A, k ∊ DA(I), r ∊ B and z ∊ T.  
First, steps 5 to 8 state that   k: ( k ∈ DA(I) : ( k ∈ A  ∧  A ∈ D(I) ) )  k ∈ V(MG) ∧ e(A, k) ∊ 
E(MG). This proves the part of directly accessed attributes with a write privilege. Second, steps 
19 to 23 state that   r: ( r ∈ DDA(k) : ( k ∈ A ∧  A ∈ D(I) ∧  r ∈ B ∧  B ∈  DD(A) ) )  r ∊ 
V(MG) ∧ {e(B, r), e(k, r)} ∊ E(MG). This proves the part of directly dependent attributes. 
Finally, steps 32 to 36 state that   z: ( z ∈ TDA(k) : ( k ∈ A ∧  A ∈ D(I) ∧  z ∈ T ∧  T ∈ TD(A))) 
 z ∊ V(MG) ) ∧ {e(T, z), e(k, z)} ∊ E(MG). This proves the third case.     
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( ) (Proof by Contradiction) Suppose that ∃k ∈ MG: (k ∉  DA(I) ∧  k ∉  DDA(s) ∧  k ∉ 
TDA(s)), where s ∈ DA (I). In this case, there are four cases:  
1) k ∈ A , where A ∈ D(I) but k ∉   DA(I). In this case, k is excluded (not added) using steps 5 
to 8. 
2) k ∈ B , where B ∈ DD(A) but k ∉  DDA(s) for some A ∈ D(I) and s ∈ DA (I). In this case, k 
is excluded using steps 19 to 23.  
3) k ∈ T , where T ∈ TD(A) but k ∉ TDA(s) for some A ∈ D(I) and s ∈ DA(I). In this case, k is 
excluded using steps 32 to 36.   
4) k ∈ A and A ∈ S(P), where S(P) is a Safe Cluster of a table P that the insider can modify. In 
this case, k is excluded using steps 11 to 13. 
Obviously, all mentioned cases contradict the assumption.□ 
 
5.5 Preventing Malicious Modifications 
Preventing malicious modifications can be handled in two ways. The first method is to hide the 
dependencies that may be used by insiders to launch unauthorized modifications. The second 
method is not to grant insiders write accesses to data items that may be used to make 
unauthorized modifications to sensitive data items.  
 
5.5.1 Hiding Dependencies 
As discussed earlier, the discovery of dependencies by insiders may pose a threat; it allows them 
to make changes to unauthorized data items. For instance, the insider who has access to the Rank 
attribute can change the Salary attribute of an academic staff. However, if the insider is not 
familiar with the dependency, s/he may not make unauthorized modifications. Actually, an 
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insider can still make changes but these changes will be random, and a random change will 
generate suspicion. Determining which dependencies should be hidden depends on the sensitivity 
of the data items. That is, some data items are not important enough for insiders to be interested 
in changing. The level of importance defines the sensitivity of data items. A Sensitive Data Item 
is defined as follows. 
 
 
Definition 28 (Sensitive Data Item). A Sensitive Data Item is a data item which insiders may be 
interested in changing due the importance and secrecy of the information that it contains. 
 
 
Determination of the sensitivity of a data item is performed by administrators who can assign 
values between 0% for insensitive data items and 100% for highly sensitive data items. 
Administrators should consider the importance of data items when assigning sensitivity values. 
To determine which dependencies should be hidden from an insider, the Sensitivity and 
Dependency Graph (SDG) is introduced, which shows the dependencies among attributes in 
different tables without revealing any further details about them, such as constraints. But 
purposely, it contains the sensitivity values of different attributes. This facilitates determining the 
Cut, which is defined as follows. 
 
 
Definition 29 (Cut). Given a set of dependencies S in a relational database, a Cut is a set of 
dependencies C ⊆ S that should be hidden from the insider under consideration. 
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Those edges (dependencies) have destination attributes with sensitivity values greater than a 
predefined threshold for the insider under consideration. Hence, when an insider has a write 
access to a Hot Attribute [White09b], many dependencies need to be hidden from him/her. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows an example of determining a Cut in SDG. The weights on edges indicate the 
sensitivity of the destination attributes. The Cut shows that the dependencies {XR, XQ, 
PZ} should be hidden from the insider who has a write access on X and not on Z, Q and R. In 
addition, the insider should be prevented from collaborating with insiders who have access to 
attributes Z, Q and R.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5.1.1 The Algorithm  
Algorithm 5.2 shows how to determine which dependencies should be hidden from an insider. 
To determine a Cut, a threshold value should be set first. Then, a Breadth First Search is used, 
which starts from the attribute on which the insider has a write access to determine which edges 
belong to the Cut (step 7). Strictly speaking, all edges that have sensitivity values greater than the 
Figure 5.3. Determining a Cut in the Sensitivity and Dependency Graph. 
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threshold value are added to the Cut (steps 9-10). For instance, assume that the threshold value in 
the example (in Figure 5.3) is 50%.  Thus, all dependencies in the Cut have dependent attributes 
with sensitivity values greater than 50%.   
 
 
 
 
5.4.1.2 The Proof of Correctness of Algorithm 5.2 
The following theorem proves the correctness of the algorithm. 
Algorithm 5.2. The Cut Algorithm. 
Input: CDG, Set of attributes S, an insider I. 
Output:  A Cut C. 
1. Let X be the attribute to which the insider has a write access 
2. Initialize the Sensitivity and Dependency Graph using the CDG 
3. Initialize a cut C={} 
4. Initialize S = {X} 
5. While S ≠ {} 
6.    Pick an attribute Z from S 
7.    Run a breadth first search on Z 
8.    For each attribute Y ∊ adjacent(Z)  // the edge e(Z, Y) ∊  SDG  
9.       If sensitivity(e(Z,Y)) > threshold  
10.              C = C ∪ { e(Z,Y) } // add the edge to the SDG 
11.       Else  
12.              S=S ∪ {Y} 
13.       Endif 
14.    Endfor 
15. Endwhile 
16. Return C as the cut 
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Theorem 3. Let X be an attribute to which an insider has a write access, U and V are two other 
attributes, and C is a Cut.  Then: 
e(U,V)∊ C ⇔ (∃ P(X,U):( Z ∊ P(X,U):Sensitivity(Z) < Threshold(Z) ) ∧ (Sensitivity(V) > 
Threshold(V) ), where P(X,U) denotes a path from the attribute X to an attribute U. 
    
This theorem states that a Cut contains an edge e(U,V) if and only if there is a path  XU, such 
that all attributes along this path have a sensitivity value less than the threshold value and the 
sensitivity of V is greater than the threshold value. Hence, the threshold value of an attribute 
relative to the insider under consideration determines whether the attribute is sensitive or not for 
the insider. 
 
 
Proof:  
() Suppose that e(X,Y) ∊ P(X,U). In addition, assume that Sensitivity (Y) ≤ Threshold(Y). In 
this case, Y ∊ S by steps 11 - 12. Later, Y will be picked from S since steps 5 - 6 pick a vertex 
from S recursively until S is empty. Now, by steps 8 and 11 - 12,  K ∊ Adjacent(Y) ∧ Sensitivity 
(K) ≤ Threshold(K)  K ∊ S. Continuously, the algorithm picks vertices on the path XU as 
long as their sensitivity is less than or equal to the threshold value. However, it stops checking 
the adjacent vertices of any vertex, say L, if the sensitivity of L is greater than the threshold 
value, which is clear in steps 9-10. When reaching U,   R: R ∊ Adjacent(U) ∧ Sensitivity (R) > 
Threshold (R)  (U,R) ∊ C (by steps 9 - 10). Thus, since sensitivity(V) > Threshold(V), the 
edge e(U,V) is added to the Cut. This completes the first part of the proof. 
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() (Proof by Contradiction) Suppose that e(U, V) ∊ C ∧ (   P(X,U) : ( ∃ Y∊ P(X,U) : 
Sensitivity(Y) > Threshold(Y) ). Now, let Z be the predecessor of Y. In this case, e(Z, Y) ∊ C by 
steps 9 -10, and hence, Y will not be added to the set S as shown by steps 9-13. As a result, since 
Y ∊ P(X,U), U will not be reached. Thus, e(U,V) ∉ C, which is a contradiction. □ 
 
This proves the correctness of the algorithm. In summary, Theorem 3 proves that a Cut contains 
an edge, say e(U,V), if the following conditions are satisfied:  
1) Its endpoints are reachable from the vertex, say X, to which the insider has write access.  
2) There is a path from X to V, such that all of the vertices along that path (except V) have a 
sensitivity value less than or equal the threshold value. 
3) The sensitivity value of the destination of the edge (V in this case) is greater than the 
threshold value. 
 
 
5.5.2 Denying Write Access Requests 
It may not always be possible to hide dependencies. In these cases, the solution is not to grant 
insiders write accesses on data items in which a change may cause a change in sensitive data 
items. For instance, using the graph in Figure 5.3, granting an insider write access to the data 
item X enables the insider to make changes in data items P, Z, Q and R. Thus, if some of these 
data items are sensitive, and hiding dependencies is not possible, the insider should not get write 
access to X.  
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Insiders can make approximate or exact changes to unauthorized data items based on 
dependencies and/or constraints they can discover. For instance, consider the dependencies 
{Rank Base_Salary, (Base_Salary, Experience)  Salary}, where Salary = Base_Salary + 100 
* Experience. Suppose that the Salary attribute is a sensitive data item. Assume also that the 
insider under consideration is familiar with the corresponding dependencies and constraints. 
Now, if the insider has write access to Rank only, s/he can change the corresponding Salary to an 
amount close enough to what s/he wishes. Whereas by having a write access to Experience, s/he 
can make some minor changes to Salary. On the other hand, by having a write access to both the 
Rank and Experience, the insider can change Salary to any value s/he wants. Administrators 
should take this into account when granting write access to data items. However, denying write 
access to some data items may affect the tasks the insiders are able to perform. 
 
Modification Graphs MGs show how to predict an unauthorized modification threat. For 
example, using the CDG in Figure 5.1, suppose that an insider has write access to the attribute a1 
in table T1. In this case, the MG of the insider is shown in Figure 5.4, which shows that the 
insider can change attributes a2 and a6 in tables T1 and T2   respectively although s/he  may  not  
have write access to these attributes. Thus, if one of these attributes is sensitive, administrators 
may deny the insider’s write access to a1 in order to avoid the threat.  However, as discussed 
earlier, denying write access may hinder the performance of some insiders and also reduce the 
availability of data items. Thus, the preferable approach is to hide the dependencies, if possible, 
instead of denying write accesses. 
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5.6 An Example Scenario 
 This section introduces a simple real world example of using the Cut algorithm to prevent 
insider threat without limiting the availability of data items. Consider the example in Figure 5.1, 
suppose that the sensitivity values of the data items are as shown in Table 5.1. Sensitivity values 
indicate the importance and the secrecy of data items as discussed earlier. Figure 5.5 represents 
the SDG for the given database based on the dependencies and the sensitivity values of the data 
items. As discussed earlier, weights on edges represent the sensitivity of the destination data 
items. Notice that the starting data items (Rank and Number of dependents) do not have 
sensitivity values. This is because the SDG is used to show the hidden threat when granting write 
accesses to some data items (the starting data items). However, if a write access on those data 
items is requested by an insider who is not allowed to modify them, his/her request is denied 
without constructing the corresponding SDG. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.1. SENSITIVITY VALUES ACCORDING TO THE INSIDER K 
Data item Sensitivity 
Rank 20% 
Base_Salary 90% 
Experience 10% 
Number of Dependents 30% 
HI_Premium 90% 
Salary 100% 
Net_Salary 100% 
Tax 10% 
Figure 5.4 A Modification Graph. 
a2 
T2 T1 
  I 
a1 a6 
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Assume that the threshold value of the insider (Bob) is 50%, which means that he is not allowed 
to modify data items with sensitivity values greater than 50%. Now, suppose that Bob requests a 
write access on Rank and Experience attributes and on the Dependents table. In this case, if he is 
given write access to those data items, he can indirectly modify the sensitive data items: 
Base_Salary, Salary, HI_Premium and Net_Salary, which is a threat. It happens if Bob is 
familiar with the dependencies. Thus, to prevent this threat, we should ensure that some 
dependencies are hidden from Bob before giving him the requested write accesses. To show 
which dependencies should be hidden to prevent the threat, the Cut algorithm is used. Using the 
algorithm, the set of dependencies that should be hidden from Bob is shown in Figure 5.5 by a 
dashed line. By hiding those dependencies, the requested accesses can be granted and the threat 
is minimized or prevented. However, if it is not possible to hide those dependencies, Bob’s 
access requests should be denied. This simple example shows the effect of hiding some 
dependencies to prevent insider threat. In addition, it shows how hiding dependencies increases 
the availability of data items so that insiders can perform their jobs without limiting their 
performance. 
Number of 
Dependents 
Net_Salary 
 
Experience 
Salary 
Figure 5.5.The SDG of the Academic Staff Database in Figure 5.1 
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5.7 How Insiders Discover Dependencies 
Insiders may discover dependencies in several ways. First, they may discover dependencies by 
accessing the metadata of a relational database directly, which is fairly straight forward. Second, 
they may discover dependencies by collaborating with other insiders in the same organization. 
For instance, suppose that Alice has a write access to a table T1 and Bob has a read access on 
table T2.  In addition, assume that neither of the two insiders is familiar with the dependencies 
between the two tables. Now, suppose that Alice needs to modify some value in T2. To do this, 
she can collaborate with Bob to check whether there is a dependency between the two tables; 
Alice makes changes in T1 until a change happens in T2. Then, Bob informs Alice about the 
change that happens in T2. As a result of this operation, the collaborative insiders can discover 
the dependencies as well as the constraints between the two tables. Figure 5.6 demonstrates this 
process. Discussions about the prevention of collaborative attacks are beyond the scope of the 
dissertation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, an insider may discover dependencies by inferring relationships among data items that 
s/he retrieves. Moreover, s/he can infer the constraints on dependencies partially or totally. For 
instance, suppose that the relationship between the Rank of an academic staff and his/her 
Base_Salary is as shown in Figure 5.7. Assume that Alice has accessed tuples 1 and 3. In this 
Alice makes changes in T1   until a 
change happens in T2.              
Bob informs Alice about the 
change.  
 
T1 T2 
Figure 5.6.  Collaborative Attacks. 
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case, she may assume that there is a dependency between the Rank and the Base_Salary, and that 
assistant professors have a Base_Salary of 75K.  Moreover, she updates her knowledge about 
dependencies and constraints when she accesses more tuples. 
 
 
 
   
 
5.8   Hiding Dependencies: When and How? 
Hiding dependencies requires preventing the operations that may expose them. However, only 
sensitive dependencies need to be hidden, where a sensitive dependency is a dependency that 
may be used to make malicious modifications to sensitive data items.  Obviously, hiding 
dependencies may limit the availability of data items and insiders’ tasks as well. Thus, this 
process should be performed when the cost of allowing the discovery of a sensitive dependency 
is greater than the cost of hiding it. For instance, in Figure 5.5, if an insider has a write access to 
Rank only, having him/her discover the dependency between Rank and Base_Salary would be 
costly from security viewpoint. This is because modifying the Rank changes the value of 
Base_Salary, Salary, and Net Salary, which are unauthorized sensitive data items. To prevent the 
threat illustrated in this example, this dissertation proposes two solutions. The first one is to 
prevent the corresponding insider from discovering the dependency, which can be achieved by 
preventing him/her from getting a read access to the Base_Salary. In this case, the insider can get 
a write access to the Rank attribute only without posing a threat. The second solution is not to 
grant the insider a write access on the Rank attribute and to allow him/her to read the data item 
Name Rank  Base_Salary 
Jeff Mayor  Assistant Prof.  75K 
Nancy Bishop  Prof. 100K 
Dale Bush Assistant. Prof.  75K 
Gordon Thompson Prof. 100K 
 
Figure 5.7. Academic Staff’s Base_Salary 
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(Rank, Base_Salary). However, both solutions limit the availability of data items. That is, there 
is a cost in terms of availability; but not in terms of security. 
 
In light of the previous discussion, preventing the operations that may lead to exposure of 
sensitive dependencies or update of sensitive information has a cost on the availability of data 
items and also on the insiders’ job performance. On the other hand, allowing these operations 
may help insiders in making malicious modifications to unauthorized data items, which has a 
cost to the security of the system. Therefore, to help in decision making process, the cost of each 
possible solution must be computed and the one with the least cost should be chosen. The cost of 
a solution can be measured according to its effect on the availability and on the security of data 
items. Formula 1 computes the cost of a solution.   
 
Cost (S)=∑                + ∑                
 
                                          (1) 
 
where S indicates the solution chosen, i represents the attribute that is limited (prevented) by 
applying S, Imp(i) indicates the importance of the data item i according to the insider under 
consideration, which represents the necessity of i in performing the insider’s tasks. For example, 
the data items that are used by the insider to perform a group of tasks are more important than 
data items that are used to perform a single task.  This value may be given either by the insider or 
assigned by the system based on the tasks that should be performed by the insider. The term j 
represents an unauthorized attribute that may be exposed by applying S, sensitivity(j) shows the 
sensitivity of the attribute j. Wa and Ws indicate the weights associated with the availability and 
sensitivity respectively. These values are used to determine which is preferable between limiting 
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the availability of attributes and exposing sensitive information. Hence, these values may differ 
according to attributes, and are assigned by the system.  Likewise, the sensitivity of an attribute 
is assigned by estimating the damage that may be caused by revealing or modifying the attribute.  
A value for sensitivity is assigned by the system as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To clarify the concept, consider Figure 5.8, which represents the sensitivity and the importance 
values of the attributes shown in Figure 5.7 for the insider (Bob). Assume that Wa and Ws are 2 
and 3 respectively. Now, suppose that Bob has permissions to read all attributes of all records 
and modify the Rank attribute of all records, but he is not allowed to modify the Base_Salary 
attribute. Obviously, allowing the insider to access what he is allowed to access poses threat. 
Strictly speaking, Bob may infer the dependency [Rank Base_Salary] and associated 
constraints. In this case, Bob may use this knowledge and his write privilege on the Rank 
attribute to make the changes he desires to the Base_Salary attribute without having a write 
access to it, as discussed earlier.  Although this constitutes a threat, it may be acceptable in some 
situations. Thus, this is the first solution (S1) to the problem of having the insider discover the 
dependency and make malicious modifications. The second solution (S2) is to grant Bob a read 
access on data items Rank, and Base_Salary and revoke the write access that he has on Rank. In 
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Jeff Mayor  Assistant Prof.  5 1 75K 2 10 
Nancy Bishop  Prof. 5 1 100K 2 10 
Dale Bush Associate Prof.  5 1 80K 2 10 
Gordon Bush Prof. 5 1 100K 2 10 
 
Figure 5.8. Academic Staff Base_Salary 
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this case, Bob can discover the dependency, but he is not able to make malicious modifications. 
The third solution (S3) is to deny the read access that Bob has on the Base_Salary attribute and 
grant him a write access to Rank; this hides the dependency from him, and allows him to modify 
the Rank.  Thus, Bob cannot discover the dependency and he is not able to make malicious 
modifications to Base_Salary. To choose the best solution, the cost of each one is calculated 
using Formula 4 as follows, where the number 4 on the summation symbol indicates the number 
of records in the table.  
- Cost(S1) = 0 +  ∑          = 120. 
- Cost(S2) = ∑          + 0 = 40.  
- Cost(S3) =∑          + 0 = 16. 
 
Notice that the first solution is very costly. Obviously, the best solution is S3, which hides the 
dependency from Bob. That is, limiting the availability of some data items is better than allowing 
him to make malicious modifications according to the cost estimation.    
 
5.9 Experiments and Results 
To test the efficiency of the model, a simulation was performed using MS C#.net and SQL 
Server. A sample relational database of 10 tables was created manually. The dependencies and 
the NDIG of the database were created randomly. Similarly, the access permissions, the 
importance and the sensitivity of data items according to each insider were created randomly as 
well.  
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Figure 5.9. Number of Prevented Threat (risky transactions) vs. Number of 
Transactions and the Percentage of Write Operations 
The simulation was performed by choosing the number of insiders, the number of transactions, 
the range of attributes per transaction and the weights of availability (Wa) and sensitivity (Ws). 
The model was tested according to different parameters to show its effectiveness. The parameters 
used are the number of insiders in the system, the number of transactions, and the percentage of 
write operations in transactions. For the same set of parameters’ values, the simulation was 
executed several times and the average was taken as the result. We should mention here that all 
risky transactions were caught and prevented using the proposed approach (when preventing 
threat is less costly than allowing it). Figures 5.9 and Figure 5.10 show the results of the 
simulation. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 shows the number of prevented threats (risky transactions) according to the number of 
transactions and the percentage of write operations. The number of insiders used in the 
simulation is 20, and Wa and Ws are 2 and 4 respectively. Obviously, the figure shows that as the  
number  of transactions increases, the number prevented threats, which is a trivial result since the 
number of threats is directly proportional to the number of transactions increases. In addition, the 
figure shows that, for the same number of transactions, the number of prevented threats increases 
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as the percentage of write operations increases. This is an expected result since increasing the 
number of write operations in a transaction maximizes the probability of modifying sensitive 
data items, which in turn increases the possibility of threat (and the prevented threat using the 
approach). As discussed earlier, the system chooses the solution with the lowest cost to prevent a 
threat.  
 
Preventing a threat is not always the best solution. In some cases, allowing insiders to access 
unauthorized data is better than impeding the tasks of insiders. The solutions in these cases 
depend on the weights associated with availability and sensitivity, and on the sensitivity of data 
items as well. Figure 5.10 shows the ratio of the number of prevented threats to the number of 
allowed threats according to a variable ratio between Wa and Ws. For instance, when Wa : Ws is 
1:4, the number of prevented threats is about 49 times more than the number of allowed threats. 
The figure shows that the number of prevented threats is greater than that of allowed threats 
when Wa < Ws, and the value (Number of Prevented Threats / Number of Allowed Threats) 
increases as Wa gets smaller. Whereas, the number of allowed threats is greater than the number 
of prevented threats when Wa > Ws and the value (Number of Prevented Threats / Number of 
Allowed Threats) decreases as Ws gets smaller.  
 
Obviously, the simulation demonstrates that the proposed approaches prevent insider threat 
efficiently taking into account systems preferences, where systems have to choose between 
breaching the security and limiting the availability of data items. 
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6. Organizing Access Privileges: Preventing Insider Threat without Affecting the 
Availability of Data Items 
 
6.1 Introduction  
A task of an insider may consist of several operations and may need access to different data 
items. The operations on data items of a task form a partial order. That is, some operations on 
data items should be performed in some specific order, while other operations can be performed 
without any order among themselves. In some cases, the order of granting access to data items in 
order to execute a task determines the level of risk. In other words, different orders of accesses to 
data items imposes different levels of risks. This chapter discusses the importance of organizing 
operations in concurrent tasks. Moreover, it demonstrates how to organize accesses to data items 
such that insider threat is prevented without affecting the availability of data items.  
 
6.2 The Importance of Organizing Accesses to Data Items 
The history of data accesses by insiders, when combined with data access requests, may pose a 
serious threat. As discussed in previous chapters, insiders can use data items they have accessed 
in the past (in knowledgebases) to infer sensitive information. In concurrent tasks, not 
considering knowledgebases and random executing of tasks’ operations may pose threat or limit 
insiders’ tasks. However, the operations of tasks can be organized such that the threat of 
knowledgebases is eliminated without limiting insiders’ tasks. Figure 6.1 shows an instance of 
the task of an insider, which is represented by a task graph, and his/her knowledgebase. A task 
graph is defined as follows.  
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Definition 30 (Task Graph). A task graph TG(V,E) is a directed graph that is used to show the 
operations and their precedence constraints in a task, where: 
- V represents operations on data items, such that: 
o r indicates read access. 
o w indicates write access. 
- E represents edges, such that: 
o An edge e(O(x),O(y)) means that O(x) should be executed before O(y), where O is an 
operation, and x and y are data items. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously, a task graph represents the data items that should be accessed to perform a task as 
well as the required operations (read or write). In addition, it demonstrates the required 
sequences of accesses on those data items (precedence constraints). Moreover, tasks’ graphs 
show the different sequences of operations that can be followed to execute the same task. Strictly 
speaking, operations that have no precedence constraints can be executed in different orders to 
perform the task. In Figure 6.1, the task graph is enclosed by rectangles and the knowledgebase 
Figure 6.1.  A Sequence of Operations to Perform a Task. 
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is represented by a dashed oval. Solid arrows represent precedence constraints between 
operations. Whereas dashed arrows point to unauthorized inferred knowledge. For example, L 
and z can be used to get information (using dependencies) about S, which is unauthorized to the 
insider under consideration. Hence, the dashed square contains unauthorized data items. 
 
In order to execute the insider’s task, the insider needs to get access to data items X and Y to 
work on the data item A. Next, s/he needs an access to B to work on K and so on until s/he 
reaches Q. Notice, that the insider can get access to Z before getting access to X or Y. That is, 
s/he can work on M before working on A and vice versa because the two operations are 
independent. However, s/he must work on A before working on K since they are dependent.  
 
As discussed earlier, the dashed arrows indicate that the insider can use the data item L, which is 
in his/her knowledgebase, along with the data item Z to get unauthorized information about the 
data item S. If the system discovers this threat and denies the insider’s request to Z, the 
availability of data items will be limited, which degrades the performance of the system. On the 
other hand, if the system does not discover this threat, unauthorized information will be exposed, 
which breaches the security of the system. To prevent the threat without limiting the insider’s 
task, the insider should not get a read access to Z until the lifetime of L expires. However, 
delaying the insider’s job until the lifetime of L expires is not a good solution always, since the 
delay may be too long. To solve this problem, the insider is given access to other data items to 
work on an independent operation(s) until the lifetime of L expires. For instance, the insider may 
get access to X and Y to work on A first before s/he get access to Z. We can force the lifetime of 
L to expire by giving other insiders who want to modify L write access on it. Thus, the lifetime 
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of L expires after it is updated by those insiders. In this case, after the insider under consideration 
finishes his/her work on A, giving him/her access to Z does not pose threat. Obviously, this 
approach enables concurrent insiders to get the accesses they need on different data items 
without breaching the security of the system. This example shows the importance of organizing 
accesses to data items in preventing insider threat and preserving the availability of data items. 
 
The terms risky data item and risky request are used in the rest of the chapter to indicate data 
items that can be combined to get unauthorized information. Definitions 31 and 32 formally 
define these terms.  
 
Definition 31 (A Risky Data Item). Given the knowledgebase(KB) of an insider, where KB= {k1, 
…, kn}, ki is called a risky data item if it can be used with other data items, which can be 
requested by the insider, to acquire unauthorized information.  
 
Definition 32 (A Risky Request). A request Oij, which indicates the i
th
 request in the j
th
 task that 
belongs to insider j, is called a risky request if it can be combined with a risky data item in j’s 
knowledgebase to acquire unauthorized information. 
 
For instance, in the previous example, the data item Z, when it is requested by the insider, is 
called a risky request and the data item L in his/her knowledgebase is called a risky data item. 
Organizing accesses to data items is applied by considering all concurrent insiders and their 
tasks, the data items and operations required for each task, and the dependencies between 
operations. It must be noted that investigating the knowledgebase of each insider is a major part. 
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Obviously, the system should have a full knowledge about the tasks that concurrent insiders are 
planning to execute. However, insiders execute tasks in two ways: as a batch of operations or as 
one operation at a time. The tasks in the latter case are called undeclared tasks, which are 
defined formally as follows. 
 
Definition 33 (Undeclared Tasks). A task S = {O1,O2,…, On}, where O1,O2,…, On are operations 
on data items, is called an undeclared task if it is sent by an insider to be executed as one 
operation at a time. 
 
Clearly, the operations of an undeclared task are sent by insiders to be executed as one by one, 
where each operation is executed in a single transaction. However, when a task is sent as one 
transaction that contains all the operations needed by the task, the task is called a declared task. 
Section 6.3 discusses the methods of organizing accesses in declared tasks, while section 6.4 
discusses organizing accesses in undeclared tasks. 
 
6.3 Organizing Operations in Declared Tasks 
 
In this type of tasks, an insider sends a task’s operations in one transaction. Thus, the system has 
full knowledge about the task the insider is planning to do. This enables the system to organize 
the operations of concurrent tasks (before granting risky requests) in a good sequence, which 
preserves the availability and security of data items. 
 
To understand how to organize accesses, consider the relational database schema in Figure 6.2. 
The database has the dependency {Rank  Base_Salary}. Assume that the data items (Name, 
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Rank), (Rank, Base_Salary), and (Name, Experience) are insensitive information, while the data 
items (Name, Base_Salary) and (Name, Total_Salary) are sensitive information. In addition, 
 
suppose that the salary of an academic staff is computed using the formula: Total_Salary = 
Base_Salary + 200 *  Experience. Now, assume that there are two insiders who are concurrently 
working on their tasks. Both insiders are not allowed to get information about sensitive data 
items. The task of the first insider (Insider1) consists of the following queries. 
 
Query 1: “Retrieve the name and the rank of all computer science professors” 
      Select P.FName, P. LName, P.Rank 
      From Professor P, Department D 
     Where P.DeptID = D.DeptID and D.Dname = “Computer Science” 
 
Query 2: “Retrieve the experience of professor Sami Gibson” 
       Select P.Experience 
       From Professor P 
Professor Table 
ID FName LName Rank Experience DeptID 
20012 James White Assistant Prof 3 168 
20013 Bob Tailor Full Prof 2 597 
20014 Sami Gibson Associate Prof 5 168 
  
Rank_Salary Table Department Table 
Rank Base_Salary 
 
DeptID Name Location 
Assistant Prof 100K 168 Computer Science SSED 
Associate Prof 120K 597 Electrical Engineering LKEF 
Full Prof 140K 
    
 
Figure 6.2. A Part of Academic Staff Database 
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       Where P.ID = 20014 
 
Query 3:”Retrieve the Base_Salary of associate professors”  
        Select R.Rank, R.Base_Salary 
        From Rank_Salary R 
        Where R.Rank=”Associate Prof” 
 
Obviously, the result that is added to the knowledge of Insider1 if s/he is granted the privilege to 
execute Query1 is: (< James White, Assistant Prof >, < Sami Gibson, Associate Prof >). 
Similarly, if Insider1 is granted a privilege to execute Query2 and Query3, s/he will have the 
information (< Sami Gibson, 5 >) and (< Associate Prof, 120K >) respectively.  Now, suppose 
that the task of   the   second   insider (Insider2) consists of the following query. 
 
Query 4:”Promote Sami Gibson to a Full Prof” 
       Update table Professor 
       Set Rank = ‘Full Prof’ 
       Where ID=20014 
Assume that the queries Query1 and Query2 are executed successfully. Thus, Insider1 has the 
rank and the experience of “Sami Gibson” in his/her knowledge. Next, if Query3 is executed, 
Insider1 gets the knowledge < Associate Prof, 120K >. In this case, s/he can combine this 
insensitive knowledge with the insensitive knowledge < Sami Gibson, Associate Prof > and 
<Sami Gibson, 5> to get the unauthorized information <Sami Gibson, 120K> and <Sami Gibson, 
121K>, which indicates the Base_Salary and Total_Salary of “Sami Gibson”. Although 
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executing the task of Insider2 after that changes this information, Insider1 still knows that at the 
time s/he executed his/her query Sami’s total salary was 121K, which is correct and unauthorized 
information. On the other hand, if the system discovers this threat and prevents Insider1’s 
request, Insider1’s job will be rejected. Thus, both cases affect the system negatively.    
 
Let us consider another scenario for satisfying the requests of the two insiders. Suppose that 
Query4 is executed before Query3. This means that Insider2 promotes the rank of “Sami 
Gibson” from associate professor to full professor before Insider1 gets access to the Base_Salary 
of associate professors. In this case, if Insider1 uses the data item in his/her knowledgebase to 
infer information, his/her inference will be incorrect. Thus, Insider1’s task will be executed 
normally. Obviously, this scenario prevents insider threat without limiting the availability of data 
items. Notice that the data item <Name, Rank>, which has been acquired by Query1 is called a 
risky data item. Similarly, the request <Rank, Salary> that is requested by Query3 is called a 
risky request. The request in Query4 (updating the rank of “Sami Gibson”) is called an 
Effacement Request since it removes the threat of the risky request in Query3. An effacement 
request is defined as follows.  
 
Definition 34 (An Effacement Request). A request Oij, which indicates the i
th
 request in the j
th
 
task that belongs to insider j, is called an effacement request if it satisfies the following 
conditions: 
1- O=Write(R) ∧ ( Write(R)  (Expire(R) =True) ). 
2- ( R ∈ KB(h) ) ∧ (  j ≠ h ). 
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Definition 34 states that an effacement request by an insider j must be a write operation that 
updates a data item R and makes it expire, where R belongs to the knowledgebase of a different 
insider than j. That is, a write request by an insider j that updates a data item in his/her 
knowledgebase is not considered an effacement request. 
 
The example clarifies the importance of choosing the order of executing the requested operations 
in preventing insider threat without limiting insiders’ tasks. It shows that the sequence <Query1, 
Query2, Query3, Query4> pose a threat, while the sequence <Query1, Query2, Query4, Query3> 
does not pose any threat. The first sequence is called a safe sequence, which is introduced next in 
Definition 35. The next section discusses how to choose a safe sequence for executing the 
operations of concurrent tasks. 
 
Definition 35 (A Safe Sequence). Given a sequence of operations S = {O1,O2,…, On}, where 
O1,O2,…, On are operations on data items that belong to concurrent tasks. S is called a Safe 
Sequence if executing the operations in S’s order does not reveal unauthorized information and 
preserves the availability of data items. 
 
6.3.1 Choosing a Safe Sequence 
After considering concurrent insiders in a system and their tasks, the system organizes the 
accesses to data items to prevent any insider threat and preserve the availability. There are many 
possible sequences of data access to execute a task. Finding a safe sequence is the objective of 
this section.  However, choosing a safe sequence of operations is not always achievable. Thus, in 
these cases, an acceptable sequence should be chosen, which is defined as follows. 
105 
 
Definition 36 (Acceptable Sequence).  Given a sequence of operations S = {O1,O2,…, On}, 
where O1,O2,…, On are operations on data items that belong to concurrent tasks. S is called an 
Acceptable Sequence if executing the operations in S’s order reveals insignificant unauthorized 
information, which does not pose any intolerable threat to the system, and preserves the 
availability of data items.  
 
Security administrators decide whether the revealed information is insignificant or not, or 
whether it poses an intolerable threat. In order to choose either a safe or an acceptable sequence, 
the risk of granting each request is computed. The risk of a request is the maximum difference 
between the sensitivity of each data item that may be revealed by granting the request and the 
threshold value of the insider about that data item. The following formula shows how to compute 
the risk of requested operations, where Rj is a request by insider I, n is the number of data items 
in the database under consideration, Sensitivity(di)  is a the amount of information that may be 
revealed about the data item di by granting Rj, and Threshold (I, di) is the threshold value of I 
about di. 
 
Risk(Rj)=      
 (Sensitivity(di) - Threshold(I, di))                                          (1) 
 
 
Formula 1 measures the risk of a request independently. That is, it looks at the knowledgebase of 
the insider under consideration to see if the current request can be combined with some data 
items in his/her knowledgebase to get unauthorized information. The formula does not pay 
attention to other operations that are executed before it. However, the risk value of a sequence is 
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computed by considering the order of operation in the sequence. The risk of the each sequence is 
computed using Formula 2, where n indicates the number of requests in a sequence. 
 
Risk(Sj) = Σ
n
i=1 Risk(Ri|R1 … Ri-1)                                                 (2) 
 
 
Obviously, the value that is computed in Formula 2 is the sum of the risk values of requests in a 
sequence with taking into account the order of requests. To clarify this point, we should mention 
that the risk of a request that is computed independently (the value computed in Formula 1) 
differs when we consider previous requests. That is, as we discussed before, a request(s), say R, 
may update a risky data item(s), say K, that exist in the knowledgebase of an insider and make it 
expire. Thus, the insider who has K in his/her knowledgebase cannot use it with his/her risky 
requests to infer unauthorized information. This action may reduce the risk values of successor 
risky requests after R in the corresponding sequence that can be combined with K to infer 
unauthorized information, which may reduce the risk value of the corresponding sequence. 
 
Using this method, a safe or acceptable sequence is chosen, which poses the lowest risk among 
different sequences. We should mention here that choosing a good sequence may be limited by 
the fact that some operations are dependent on each other. That is, some operations must be 
executed before other operations. Moreover, when producing a safe sequence, operations that 
should be executed before effacement requests should be put before them in any sequence. 
6.3.2 Limitations and Possible Solutions 
Organizing accesses to data items either eliminates or significantly reduces the threat of a risky 
request demanded by an insider. As discussed earlier, this is performed by letting other insiders 
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modify risky data items so that they are expired before they can be used with risky requests to 
launch an attack. But what can be done if there is no insider who requests write accesses to risky 
data items? To solve this problem, the granting of a risky request may be delayed until an 
effacement request is made. However, this method would result in data unavailability and 
degrading systems performance. Moreover, if the insider must get access to the requested data 
item to perform his/her job on a timely manner, the mentioned solution is unacceptable.   
 
When delay is unacceptable, an incorrect value of the risky request can be granted to the insider. 
After that, the system corrects the results based on the correct value of that risky request. When 
incorrect values of data items are provided to insiders, they will not be able to infer correct 
values of dependent data items. We propose to do so when the inferable data is sensitive. 
However, this approach may affect insiders’ trust about the system. To mitigate this issue, 
incorrect but close enough values must be provided while making sure that the values still do not 
disclose any sensitive data. To know how much information one can infer, the Neural 
Dependency and Inference Graph (NDIG) is used. An example of NDIG is shown in Figure 6.3, 
where cyclic inference edges are omitted for simplicity.  
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For example, suppose that an insider K had accessed the data items L and P in this database. 
Later, s/he requested the data item Z. Figure 6.4 shows K’s task and knowledgebase. Assume 
that K’s threshold is 100% for all data items except for the sensitive data item S, which is 65%. 
In addition, assume that the value of S ranges between 0 and 100, and it is computed using the 
formula: S = 4*Z + L+ P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Obviously, using the proposed approach, the insider is given an access to the data items X, R, 
and Y to work on A first. S/he is not given access to risky request Z because he/she can combine 
it with the risky data items L and P, which are in his/her knowledgebase, to get information more 
than the allowed about the data item S. Suppose that at the time, there is no insider requesting a 
write access on either L or P. In addition, assume that due to the time sensitive nature of insider 
K’s task, the system has to grant him/her the access to data item Z. Clearly, granting the request 
poses a threat. Thus, to avoid this threat, the insider is given an incorrect value of Z. Notice that 
the given incorrect value does not mean that the value of Z is changed in the database. It means 
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Figure 6.4. Insider K’s Task and Knowledgebase 
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that the system provides an incorrect value to the insider. However, this incorrect value should 
satisfy two conditions, which are: 
a) It should not be very different from the correct value, otherwise this would affect the 
insider’s trust on the system if the insider has a guess on the range of the value.  
b) Using the value, the user should not be able to make a correct estimation of the sensitive 
data item. 
 
 
After giving the insider an incorrect value of Z, the system should track the subsequent 
modifications on the data items that the insider K makes using the incorrect value of Z and 
correct those using the right value of Z. This process applies to other insiders who access such 
damaged data items as well. Damage assessment and recovery are not the focus of the 
dissertation and, therefore, the methods will not be discussed here.  As a reference, interested 
readers may review the work presented in [Yalamanchili04]. Notice that giving incorrect values 
may pose work overhead to trace the changes and fix the affected data items. However, this 
could be much less costly than breaching system security or rejecting insiders’ tasks. Moreover, 
fixing affected data items can be performed when systems have less work overhead.  
 
6.3.3 An Example Scenario 
Let Table 6.1 represent the set of concurrent insiders in the system as demonstrated in Figure 6.2, 
their knowledgebases and their current requests of data items. The dependencies in the database 
are shown in Table 6.2. Table 6.3 shows the data items in the system and their sensitivity values. 
In addition, it shows the threshold values of data items according to the insiders. The amount of 
information an insider can get about a data item is computed depending on the NDIG of the 
corresponding database.  
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Obviously, all requests are independent. Notice that both requests R1 and R2 read and write the 
Base_Salary respectively. However, R1 read the Base_Salary of associate professors, which is 
different from R2 that updates the Base_Salary of full professors. Thus, they are independent. 
This offers flexibility in organizing them in a good manner to form the lowest risk sequence. 
Clearly, there are six possible sequences for granting the requests, which are: 
- S1= { U1.R(q1), U2.W(q2), U2.W(q3) } 
- S2= { U1.R(q1), U2.W (q3), U2.W(q2) }  
Table 6.1.  Insiders and their Knowledgebases and Requests 
Insiders Knowledgebase Requests 
U1 
K1 = < James White,  Assistant Prof > 
K2 = < Sami Gibson,  Associate Prof >   
K3 = < Sami Gibson,  Experience = 5 > 
R(q1) = Read(<Rank, Base_Salary>  of  Associate 
Prof)  
                   
U2 
_ 
 
W(q2) = Write(<Base_Salary> of Full Prof) 
W(q3) = Write(<Rank> of  Sami Gibson) 
Table 6.2. Dependencies 
No. Dependency 
1 <Name,Rank>,<Rank,Base_Salary>, <Name,Experience>  <Name, Total _Salary> 
2 <Name,Rank>,<Rank,Base_Salary>  <Name, Base_Salary> 
Table 6.3.  Sensitivity and Threshold Values of Data items 
Data Item Sensitivity Threshold U1 Threshold U2 
K1 20% 100% 50% 
K2 20% 100% 40% 
K3 10% 100% 100% 
q1 50% 70% 70% 
q2 70% 100% 100% 
q3 80% 100% 100% 
<Name, Total _Salary> 100% 10% 0% 
<Name, Base_Salary> 100% 20% 10% 
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- S3= { U2.W(q2), U1.R(q1),  U2.W(q3) } 
- S4= {U2 .W(q2), U2.W(q3), U1.R(q1) } 
- S5= {U2.W(q3), U2.W(q2), U1.R(q1) } 
- S6= {U2.W(q3), U1.R(q1),  U2.W(q2) } 
Notice that the data items requested by insiders are allowed to both insiders. However, the data 
item in request q1 can be combined with risky data items in U1’s knowledgebase to infer 
unauthorized information. The risk of each independent request is computed using Formula 1 as 
follows.  
- Risk (U1.R(q1)) = 100% -10% = 90%.  
- Risk (U2.W(q2)) = 0%. 
- Risk (U2.W(q3)) = 0%.  
 
Notice that negative Risk values are considered 0. The risk of each sequence is computed using 
formula 2 as follows.  
 
- Risk (S1) = Risk ( U1.R(q1) ) + Risk ( U2.W(q2) | U1.R(q1) ) + Risk ( U2.W(q3) | U2.W(q2), 
U1.R(q1)  ) = 90%+0%+0%=90%. 
- Risk (S2) = 90%. 
- Risk (S3) = 90%. 
- Risk (S4) = 0%. 
- Risk (S5) = 0% 
- Risk (S6) = 0%. 
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Notice that in sequences S4, S5 and S6, the second insider U2 updates the Rank of “Sami Gibson” 
to full professor before the first insider U1 gets access to the Base_Salary of associate professors. 
Thus, the inference that U1 makes about the salary of “Sami Gibson” is wrong, which means that 
these sequences are safe. However, the situation is different for the rest of sequences. In these 
sequences, U1 deduces correct information about the Base_Salary and Total_Salary of “Sami 
Gibson”. Obviously, the system can choose one of the sequences S4, S5 and S6  to grant accesses 
to the insiders. Hence, the system does not need to compute the risk values for all possible 
sequences when there a safe sequence exists, which can be produced directly by placing 
effacement requests before risky requests in the sequence. 
 
6.4 Organizing Operations in Undeclared Tasks 
The method that was proposed in the previous section is applicable when tasks are declared. 
Strictly speaking, that approach depends on the assumption that systems are familiar with all 
operations of concurrent insiders’ tasks. Thus, the approach can check all concurrent tasks’ 
operations and produce a safe sequence when threat is discovered. However, this approach fails 
when tasks are undeclared. In this case, systems are familiar with the operations that are 
launched before discovering threat, but not all operations. Thus, the proposed approach in the 
previous section cannot be used to produce a safe sequence in this case. 
 
This section develops methods that can predict and prevent insider threat without limiting the 
availability of data items in concurrent undeclared tasks. In order to achieve this goal, models are 
proposed to predict the complete operations of undeclared tasks when threat is discovered. Then, 
the predicted tasks are organized into a safe sequence.  
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6.4.1  Predicting the Complete Operations of Undeclared Tasks 
As discussed earlier, preventing insider threat without limiting the availability of data items is 
performed by organizing all operations of tasks into a safe sequence. Thus, the complete 
operations of undeclared tasks should be predicted in order to produce a safe sequence. 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the predicting process of the original tasks (complete operations) of undeclared 
tasks. The predicting is needed when a threat alert is raised while concurrent undeclared tasks are 
being executed. The alert occurs when an insider orders a risky request. At this point, the system 
has only the operations that have been executed before raising the alert. These operations are 
called partial tasks of the original tasks. Next, the partial tasks are compared to a set of training 
tasks, which are a set of daily tasks that are normally executed in the system. The training tasks 
set can be developed in two ways. First, it can be developed during the building of the system 
itself by addressing all possible tasks that will be executed in the system. Second, it can be 
developed using the tasks that exist in the log file. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of comparing partial tasks to training tasks is to retrieve a set of candidate tasks to 
the partial tasks. The candidate tasks contain the correct (complete) tasks of the undeclared tasks 
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Figure 6.5. Predicting Undeclared Tasks 
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(partial tasks). Retrieving candidate tasks is performed as follows. For each partial task t, each 
task in the set of training tasks that starts with the same operations (from the left) of t is retrieved 
as a candidate task for t. For instance, the task S = { r(x), r(y), w(a), r(b), w(k)} is retrieved as a 
candidate task for the partial task Ps={r(x), r(y), w(a)}. 
 
Retrieving all candidate tasks needs considering all possible ways of executing tasks. A task can 
be executed in different ways. Insiders who have a specific role access the same data items to 
perform a specific task. However, the order of accesses to data items to perform the task may 
differ from one insider to another, which is due to the fact that a task can be executed using 
different orders of its operations. For instance, suppose that the “Salary” of an academic staff is 
computed as follows: Salary = Base_Salary + 200 * Experience. Now, to update the Salary of a 
professor who finishes another year of experience, the task would be as follows. 
{Read(Base_Salary), Write(Experience),  Write(Salary)}    or   {Write(Experience),   Read  
(Base_Salary),  Write(Salary)}. These two sequences of executing the task are called patterns of 
the task. Notice that the patterns show that there is a precedence constraint between 
{Read(Base_Salary) ,Write(Experience)} and Write(Salary), but there is no precedence 
constraint between Read(Base_Salary) and Write(Experience). Thus, the latter two operations 
can be executed in different orders. The following theorem states the conditions of considering 
two tasks as patterns for a task. 
 
Theorem 1. Given the two tasks: S = {Os1(ds1), Os2(ds2),…, Osn(dsn)} and X = {Ox1(dx1), 
Ox2(dx2),…, Oxm(dxm)}, where (Os, ds) and (Ox,dx) indicates operations (read or write) and data 
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items that belong to tasks S and X respectively. S and X are considered two patterns for the same 
task if the following conditions are satisfied. 
1- n = m. 
2-   d:d ∈ S⇔ d ∈ X. 
3-   d :O(d) ∈ S⇔ O(d) ∈ X. 
4-   (O=Write):  (Osi(dsi)Osj(dsj)) ⇔ ( Oxi(dxi) Oxj(dxj)). 
 
Theorem 1 states that two tasks are considered patterns for the same task if they have the same 
number of data items, the same operations on the same data items, and the same order of write 
operations. 
 
Retrieving all candidate tasks requires checking all patterns of tasks. For instance, the task 
{Read(Base_Salary), Write(Experience),  Write(Salary)} may not exist in the set of training 
tasks in this form. Instead, it may exist in the form:{Write(Experience),   Read  (Base_Salary),  
Write(Salary)}.  However, the task is still retrieved as a candidate task for the partial task 
{Read(Base_Salary), Write(Experience)}. Notice that retrieved original tasks should be 
confirmed by insiders to avoid executing incorrect tasks. The next section fully details this 
approach.  
 
6.4.2 Preventing Insider Threat and Preserving the Availability in Undeclared Tasks 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of constructing training tasks is to discover the tasks of 
undeclared tasks, and then, produce a safe sequence that prevent insider threat without limiting 
insiders’ tasks. The prediction is required when an insider sends a risky request. The prediction 
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method is run for all concurrent insiders’ tasks. When the process is finished, a safe sequence can 
be produced. The next section discusses this process in details. 
 
6.4.2.1 The Algorithm 
Algorithm 6.1 shows how to predict the full tasks of undeclared tasks and produce a safe 
sequence. The algorithm works as follows. When an insider, say K, sends a risky request, the 
algorithm starts predicting the candidate tasks of all undeclared tasks that are running 
concurrently. The prediction is based on the previous operations that are executed before 
discovering the risky request (steps1-2). For each insider, say Z, the prediction is performed by 
comparing the previous operations that are executed by Z to the training tasks (step 3). As 
discussed earlier, the training task(s) that starts (from the left) by the same operations, with 
taking into account the patterns of tasks, is retrieved as a candidate tasks(s) for Z’s undeclared 
task (step 4). After retrieving candidate tasks, their operations are organized in a safe sequence. 
To produce a safe sequence, the algorithm searches for an effacement request for the risky data 
item insider K’s knowledgebase (step 7 and step 13). Then, the algorithm organizes the 
operations of tasks by executing the effacement request (and its precedent operations) before 
executing the risky request to prevent the possible threat (steps 8-9 and steps 15 - 19). Notice 
that, in step 25, if no effacement request exists, the algorithm denies the risky request to prevent 
the threat. Hence, the precedent operations represent the operations that have to be executed 
before the effacement request due to operations dependencies.   
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Algorithm 6.1  Preventing Insider Threat 
Input: The set of concurrent insiders R={r1 … rn}, the set of concurrent tasks of insiders T={t1 … tn},  
knowledgebases, the set of training tasks TT={Tt1..Ttz}, Safe Sequence SS ={}, operations dependencies, 
Candidate Tasks set CT ={}, Risky Request (Rq), Risky Data Item  (RD). 
Assumptions: Training tasks that are stored in the system represent all tasks that are normally executed in the 
system. 
Output: A safe sequence for executing undeclared tasks’ operations. 
1. For each insider ri ∈ R // when a risky request Rq is discovered  
2.  Retrieve ri’s previous requests L ={qi1…  qix} //operations executed before the risky request 
3.  Let G = {Tt1… Tts} the set of training tasks that have L as starting operations // with  taking into account the 
                                                                                                                                                      patterns of tasks 
 
4.  CTi = G // retrieve G as a candidate task(s) for ri’s undeclared task 
5. If |CTk| =1 for all insiders rk ∈ R // one candidate task  for each undeclared task 
6.  Correct _Task = CTk // Retrieve CTk as the correct task for  rk’s undeclared task 
7.  Search for an effacement request (ER) //effacement request that updates the risky data item 
8.  If ER Exists 
9.     SS = {Oi=1, Oi=2, … , Oi=n}: index (ER)< index(RR) //organize the operations of tasks so that ER(and its 
                                                                                            precedent operations)  is executed before the Rq 
 
10.  Else go to step 25 
11. Else if |CTk| > 1 for an insider rk’s undeclared task// more than one candidate task? 
12. Assume that the risky request Rq∈ tp, where tp is the task of rp// risky request 
13. Search for an effacement request (ER) 
14. If ER Exists 
15.      Let ER ∈Ttcbe an effacement request, where Ttc∈ CTf ∧ f ≠ p //effacement request 
16.      Suggest ER and its precedent operations to insider rf //executing the  effacement  request  before the 
                                                                                                                                                risky request 
                                                                                       
17.      If rf accepts ER 
18.         Executes ER and its precedent operations //correct prediction of the f’s undeclared task 
19.         Execute Rq    //since the threat is eliminated 
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The following example demonstrates how the algorithm works. Suppose that there are three 
insiders R1, R2 and R3 who are executing their tasks concurrently. Assume that the 
knowledgebase of insider R1 (KB(R1)) contains the data item p, which can be combined with the 
data item d to infer the unauthorized information S1 using the dependency{(d, p)  S1}. Thus, the 
data item p is a risky data item. Now, assume that R1 requests the data item d, which is in this 
case a risky request. Using step 1, the algorithm looks back at the previous requests that have 
been executed by the insiders before discovering the risky request. Suppose that the previous 
requests are as follows: [R1:  r(a), r(b), w(c), r(d)], [R2: r(x),r(y),r(z)] and[R3: r(m), w(n)].Then, 
the algorithm searches for candidate tasks that start with these operations (steps 2-4). Suppose 
that the graphs of the retrieved candidate tasks are as shown in Figure 6.6. The double circle 
around a request indicates an effacement request, while a circle indicates a risky request. Since 
there are more than one candidate task that have been retrieved for an undeclared task, the 
algorithm moves to step 11.  Next, the algorithm checks which candidate task contains the 
effacement request (steps 12-15). In this example, the effacement request is w(p), which is in the 
first candidate task of insider R2’s undeclared task. The algorithm suggests this request (and its 
precedent operations) to insider R2 (step 16). 
20.         Allow insiders to continue performing their tasks normally //after eliminating the  threat                                                                                                        
21.         If another Rq is requested  //another threat shows up 
22.             Repeat the steps 1 to 20 
23.      Else 
24.         Search for another ER and repeat steps 13-22// incorrect candidate task  
25. Else if there is no ER exists  //no effacement operations exist 
26.      Deny Rq 
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If insider R2 accepts and executes this request (steps 17- 18), the algorithm grants insider R1 
his/her risky request r(d) to be executed after the effacement request (step 19). The executed 
sequence of operations until this point is called a partial sequence. Next, the execution of the 
operations of tasks is performed normally as they are requested by insiders until another risky 
request appears. If the proposed effacement request w(p) is rejected by insider R2, this means that 
the predicted task is incorrect. Thus, the algorithm searches for another effacement request (steps 
23-24). If no effacement request exists, R1’s task is rejected to prevent the threat. 
 
Notice that the algorithm completely organizes the operations of candidate tasks when one 
candidate task is retrieved for each undeclared task (steps 5-10). It assumes that the candidate 
tasks are the correct tasks. Whereas it produces a partial sequence (as in the example) when there 
is more than one candidate task retrieved for an undeclared task (steps 11-24). In the latter case, 
the algorithm does not organize all the operations of predicted tasks in a sequence. Instead, it 
stops after executing the effacement request and the risky request respectively. Then, it enables 
Figure 6.6.The Graphs of Candidate Tasks for the Undeclared Tasks of Insiders R1,R2 and R3 
(a) The Candidate Tasks Graphs for R1’s Task (b) The Candidate Tasks Graphs for R2’s Task 
(c) The Candidate Tasks Graphs for R3’s Task 
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insiders to continue executing their operations normally. This choice is to eliminate the possible 
overhead that may arise when predicting an incorrect task from the candidate tasks, which 
requires re-predicting and reorganizing tasks operations.  
 
In real scenarios, applying the algorithm could pose time overhead. However, not using the 
approach limits the availability of data items (insiders’ tasks) or degrades a system’s security. 
Strictly speaking, not discovering risky requests exposes systems’ sensitive information, which 
poses dangerous effects on critical systems such as military systems. Similarly, discovering risky 
requests and denying them to prevent insider threat limits the availability of data items and 
affects insiders’ tasks, which degrades systems performance especially in online systems. 
Contrarily, adopting the proposed approach prevents insider threat without affecting insiders’ 
tasks. The system may decide which is least costly according to its own requirements? Exposing 
system’s sensitive assets or limiting the availability of data items or accepting the delay of 
applying the proposed approaches. Section 6.5 demonstrates the conditions under which the 
proposed approach works with greatest performance and least delay. 
 
6.4.2.2 The Proof of Correctness 
The algorithm consists of two main parts, which are predicting correct candidate tasks and 
organizing the operations of predicted tasks in a safe sequence. The following theorems prove 
that the algorithm addresses the correct steps to perform these parts.  
 
Theorem 2. Given the training tasks Tt1,Tt2…Ttn , and a poset of operations S = {O1, O2… Ok}: S 
⊂UT, where UT represents an undeclared task, then: 
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      Tti∊ CT(UT) ⇔ S ⊂ Tti  ∧ Tti ∊ patterns(UT) ∧ (                  
 ) 
 
Where S represents the set of operations that are executed to perform UT before discovering a 
risky request, CT(UT) indicates the set of candidate tasks  for UT. 
 
The theorem addresses the conditions of considering a training task as a candidate task for an 
undeclared task.  
 
Proof:  
The proof of this algorithm is fairly straight forward. Since UT is an undeclared task and the only 
known part of it is S, any training task, say Tti, that starts with the operations of S could be the 
correct task of UT (steps 2-4). In other words, the insider who has executed the operations in S, is 
probably going to perform the training task Tti. Thus, Tti is considered a candidate task for UT. 
Notice that the comparison is performed with taking into account the precedence constraints and 
the patterns of tasks as discussed in 4.2 (step 3).□ 
 
Theorem 3. Given two sequences for executing the operations of concurrent tasks in a system, 
S(O1…, ER,…,RR,…, On) and S’(O1,…, RR,…,ER,..., On), where Oi is an  
operation, RR is a risky request and ER is an effacement request. Then: 
- Threat (S) < Threat(S’). 
- Availability (DI(S)) >Availability(DI(S’)), where DI(S) and DI(S’)  indicates the data items in 
S and S’ respectively. 
 
122 
 
The theorem states that executing an effacement request before a risky request prevents insider 
threat and preserves the availability of data items. Choosing a safe sequence is performed using 
steps 8-9 and 12-20.  
 
Proof: 
Suppose that RR, ER and RD are a risky request, an effacement request, and a risky data item 
respectively. As discussed earlier, based on definitions 31 and 32, combining RR and RD may 
expose unauthorized information, which is threat. On the contrary, if the system discovers this 
threat when an insider requests RR, the system may deny RR, which reduces the availability of 
the data items needed for the insider’s task. Thus, both possibilities are problematic. Next, the 
correctness of the algorithm is proved by contradiction as follows. 
 
(Proof by contradiction) Suppose that both sequences S and S’ are executed, but Threat(S) < 
Threat(S’) and Availability(DI(S)) <Availability(DI(S’)). Now, in sequence S, ER is executed 
before RR. This means that RD is expired before executing RR. Thus, the inference that is based 
on combining RD with RR is incorrect, which means that no threat exists. Moreover, RR is 
granted and executed, which means that the availability of data items is not limited. Meanwhile, 
in S’, RR is executed before ER. In this case, the inference that is based on combining RR and RD 
is correct since the value of RD is not expired yet, which is threat. Thus, Threat (S’) > Threat(S), 
which contradicts the assumption. Contrarily, suppose that the system discovers this possible 
threat and denies the insider access to RR to prevent the threat. This action limits the availability 
of RR, which is a data item in S’. As a result, Availability(DI(S)) >Availability(DI(S’)). 
Contradiction.□ 
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The theorems above prove the correctness of predicting tasks graphs using the algorithm. 
Moreover, they prove the correctness of organizing access privileges in preventing the threat and 
increasing the availability of data items.  
 
6.4.3 A Real World Example Scenario 
The following example clarifies how the algorithm works in real world scenarios. Suppose that 
the two insiders Amy and Ashley want to submit the following tasks to the corresponding 
system. Hence, the insiders submit their tasks as one operation at a time. Amy’s task is as 
follows. 
Query1:                                                       Query2: 
Select E.Address                                         Select E.Rank 
From Employee E                                      From Employee E 
Where E.Name=”Jif”                               Where E.Name=”Jif” 
Where Ashley’s task is as follows. 
Query3:          Query4:                                  Query5: 
Select S.BaseSalary           Update table Employee          Update table Employee  
From Employee S              Set Experience= 5                  Set Salary =BaseSalary + 
Where S.Name=”Jif”       Where Name= “Jif”                             100*Experience   
                   Where Name= “Jif” 
Suppose that the corresponding relational database has the following dependencies: {Rank 
BaseSalary}, {Salary  (BaseSalary, Experience)}, where Salary = BaseSalary + 100* 
Experience. In addition, assume that Amy’s knowledgebase contains the information (Jif, 4), 
124 
 
which indicates the experience of Jif, and the information (Jif, Salary) is unauthorized 
information to Amy. Now, suppose that Query1 and Query3 have been executed and Amy has 
just submitted Query2, which contains a risky request Read(Rank). This request invokes the 
algorithm. In this case, the algorithm starts predicting the candidate tasks for these undeclared 
tasks. Assume that the algorithm has retrieved one candidate task for each task (steps 1-4) as 
shown in Figure 6.7. In this case, the algorithm supposes that these are the correct candidate 
tasks for the undeclared tasks (Steps 5-6). Step 7 searches for an effacement request, which is 
w(Experience)(Query4) in this case, and step 8 organizes the operations in a safe sequence by 
placing w(Experience) before Read(Rank). At the end, the safe sequence would be as follows: 
{r(Address), w(Experience), r(Rank), r(BaseSalary), w(Salary)}.This sequence removes the 
possible threat that may arise if Amy’s task is executed before Ashley’s task. Moreover, the 
availability of data items is preserved and both tasks are executed.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5 Experiments and Analysis 
The simulation was performed using SQL Server and MS C#.net to test the effectiveness of the 
proposed approaches. A sample relational database of 10 tables was created manually. The 
Figure 6.7. (a) Amy’s Task Graph (b) Ashley’s Task Graph 
r(Rank) r(Address) 
r(BaseSalary) 
w(Experience) 
w(Salary) 
(a) (b) 
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dependencies and access permissions were created randomly. Similarly, different sizes of 
training tasks were created randomly as well. 
 
The simulation consists of two parts. The first part demonstrates the percentage of prevented 
threat using a safe sequence under different conditions. It shows the effectiveness of the 
proposed approaches discussed in section 6.3 (declared tasks). The second part demonstrates the 
relationship between the positions of risky requests in risky transactions and the number of 
retrieved candidate tasks. Moreover, it shows the relationship between the size of training sets 
and the number of retrieved candidate tasks. This part shows demonstrates the effectiveness of 
using the proposed approaches discussed in section 6.4 (undeclared tasks).   
 
6.5.1 The Percentage of Safe Sequences 
In this part, the simulation parameters consist of the number of concurrent insiders and the 
percentage of write operations in transactions. For the same parameters’ values, the simulation 
was executed many times and the average was taken as the result. Similarly, the simulation was 
performed according to different sizes of training sets, and the average was taken as the final 
result. We should mention here that all risky transactions were caught and prevented using the 
proposed approaches.  As discussed earlier, the proposed approaches prevent threat by choosing 
a safe sequence, or denying insiders’ risky requests if finding a safe sequence (effacement 
request) is not possible. The simulation shows the percentage of prevented threat using a safe 
sequence in comparing to overall prevented threat. Producing a safe sequence prevents threat 
without limiting the availability of data items. However, denying access requests prevents threat 
but limits the availability of some data items. Hence, it is assumed that the system is able to find 
126 
 
a safe sequence when an effacement request exists. Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show the results of this 
part of simulation. 
 
Figure 6.8 shows the percentage of safe sequences using the proposed approach when the 
number of concurrent insiders is variable. The percentage of write operations in transactions is 
fixed at 50% in this simulation. As shown, the percentage of prevented threat is 0 at round 1. 
This is expected since at round 1 the insiders start executing transactions. Thus, their 
knowledgebases are empty, which means that there is no threat posed by their knowledgebase, 
and as a result, there is no prevented threat. As knowledgebases grow, the threat may increase, 
but the figure shows no trend such as increasing or decreasing in the percentage of safe 
sequences. The analysis of this result is as follows. When the knowledgebase of an insider gets 
larger, the probability of finding a risky data item and a risky request may increase. However, the 
number of risky data items or risky requests by an insider is limited by the maximum number of 
data items s/he can request to perform his/her task, which is set to be 6 for this simulation. 
Moreover, there are many insiders in the system that may order effacement requests. This makes 
the percentage (Safe Sequences/ Prevented Threats) stable in general as knowledgebases grow.   
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Figure 6.8.The percentage of the prevented threat using a safe sequence in 
comparing to different numbers of concurrent insiders. 
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The figure shows that the probability of finding a safe sequence increases when the number of 
concurrent insiders increases. Clearly, increasing the number of concurrent insiders may increase 
the number of risky requests. But the number of risky requests that may be demanded by an 
insider is limited as discussed earlier. Whereas the number of effacement requests increases as 
the number of concurrent insiders increase. Thus, the probability of finding an effacement 
request (and a safe sequence) gets larger when the number of concurrent transactions increases.  
 
Figure 6.9 shows the percentage of prevented threat using a safe sequence according to different 
percentages of write operations. The number of concurrent insiders is fixed at 10 for this 
simulation. The figure shows that when the percentage of write operations increases, the 
percentage of finding a safe sequence increases. Obviously, increasing the write operations in the 
concurrent transactions increases the possibility of finding effacement requests, which increases 
the possibility of finding a safe sequence. Moreover, the figure shows that no increasing or 
decreasing trend exists as the knowledgebases of insiders grow, which is the same result that is 
shown in Figure 6.8. 
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As discussed earlier, finding a safe sequence to run transactions is better than denying accesses 
according to both security and availability viewpoints. The simulation shows that the probability 
of finding a safe sequence gets larger as the number of concurrent insiders and the percentage of 
write operations in transactions increase; the percentage of safe sequences reaches about 65% 
when the number of insiders is 25 (with fixed write percentage = 50%), and it reaches about 40% 
when the percentage of write operations is 80% (with fixed number of concurrent insiders = 10). 
We should mention here that the number of posed threat depend also on the threshold values of 
insiders about data items. Hence, insiders are assumed to have direct access permission to 30% 
of data items in this simulation. 
 
6.5.2 Retrieved Candidate Tasks 
Predicting candidate tasks may pose delays in executing insiders’ tasks. The delay time depends 
on the number of candidate (similar) tasks that may be retrieved when a risky request is 
encountered. This part of simulation was performed to show how much delay is needed to 
retrieve the correct candidate task of an insider’s task when using the proposed approach in 
section 6.4 (undeclared tasks). The simulation was performed according to different sizes of 
training tasks. Figure 6.10 shows the relationship between the number of retrieved candidate 
tasks and the position of the risky request in a risky transaction. The figure shows that the 
number of candidate tasks increases when the position of the risky request (RR) gets smaller. 
This is a normal result since when a risky request is encountered in a transaction; the approach 
looks back into the operations that are executed before the risky request in the transaction. Then, 
it searches for tasks in the training set that start with the same set of data items, operations and 
the order of write operations. Thus, when the number of these data items increases, the number 
129 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
1 2 3 4 5 6
Round Number 
Number of Retrieved
Candidate Tasks
Position of RR
of tasks that satisfy these conditions decreases. That is, when the position of RR gets greater, the 
number of candidate tasks decreases, and vice versa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows that the maximum number of retrieved candidate tasks for each insider is about 
0.28, which happens when the position of RR is 2.1. These values are average values since the 
simulation was performed for several rounds and the average was taken as the final result. This 
number of candidate tasks poses little cost on delay when executing transactions, especially, 
when this cost is compared to security or availability costs that would be paid in case of insider 
attacks. However, this simulation was performed with 15 concurrent insiders and 150 training 
tasks. The next figure reveals more details when these numbers get larger.  
 
Figure 6.10.The relationship between the number of retrieved candidate tasks 
and the position of a risky request (RR) in a risky transaction. 
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Figure 6.11 shows the relationship between the number of candidate tasks and the size of the 
training set according to different number of concurrent insiders. We should mention here that 
the number of candidate tasks represents the average number for each insider, which has been 
calculated according to several rounds. The figure shows that as the size of the training set 
increases, the number of candidate tasks increases, which is a fairly straight forword restult. 
Notice that, in y-axis, the number of candidate tasks is multplied by the postion of RR. This 
conversion is to measure the number of candidate tasks according to the same postion of RR. For 
instance, suppose that when the size of the training set is 300, the number of candidate tasks and 
the position of RR are 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, assume that when the size of the training 
set is 500, those values are 0.5 and 3 respectively. To measure the number of candidate tasks 
when the position of RR is 1 in both sizes of training sets, 1 is multiplied by 2 and 0.5 is 
multiplied by 3. Notice that this conversion is performed by multiplication and not by division 
since the postion of RR and the number of candidate tasks is inversely correlated. 
Figure 6.11.  The relationship between the number of retrieved candidate tasks and the size 
of the training set. 
Number of 
Concurrent 
Insiders 
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As shown in the figure, the number of retrieved candidate tasks for each insider is about 0.3 
when the training set size is 100, but it reaches about 4 when the training set size is about 900. 
Thus, the proposed approach works better when the number of daily transactions in a system gets 
lower. The figure shows that there is no relationship between the number of concurrent insiders 
and the number of candidate tasks. This is a normal result since the number of retrieved 
candidate tasks in this simulation is the average for each insider.  Strictly speaking, the 
simulation  was performed in several rounds, and the total number of retrieved candidate tasks is 
divided by the number of rounds and the number of concurrent insiders in the system. Thus, as 
the number of insiders increases, the total number of candidate tasks increases, but the average 
stay the same in general.  
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7. Tackling Insider Threat in Cloud Relational Database Systems 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Using virtual machines to run applications is one of the main features of using the cloud, where 
cloud platforms host many applications (tenants). Adopting multi-tenancy reduces the operating 
cost by allowing powerful resources sharing among tenants. Managing virtual machines are 
required in order to achieve affective recourses utilization. Load balancing are performed using 
live migration [Das11], where virtual machines are migrated from overloaded nodes to idle (or 
low-loaded) nodes. However, live migration may pose a delay in delivering services since it 
limits the availability during migration process. Developing methodologies for efficient and low 
cost live migration has got significant attentions by researchers. A number of methods have been 
proposed for effective live migration such as Albatross [Das11] and Zehpyr [Elmore11].    
 
Security is one of the major concerns when moving to the cloud. Proving the security of data in 
the cloud is mandatory to achieve users’ trust of cloud providers. Multi-tenancy could be a 
vulnerability source. For instance, an insider may use shared resources to breach the security of 
other insiders’ tasks [Takabi10]. Moreover, the guarantee of protecting data that resides on the 
cloud from the threat of cloud providers’ employees is a major requirement by customers. 
Encryption is one of the methods suggested to protect data. For instance, CryptDB, 
Homomorphic Encryption (HOM) and Encryption Deterministic (DET) are encryption methods 
that can execute the operations of relational databases queries on encrypted data [Curino11]. 
These methods prevent the cloud providers’ employees from exposing users’ data even when 
customers’ queries are executed. Besides protecting data, authentication of users is another major 
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concern when moving to cloud. Thus, the development of digital identity management systems is 
crucial for cloud computing [Bertino09]. The agreements between cloud customers and cloud 
providers regarding the security and offered services are set using Service Level Agreements 
SLAs, which should be maintained by cloud providers. 
 
Insider threat is one of the problems that worry organizations and individuals about cloud 
computing. Moving data into the cloud increases the number of insiders, which increases insider 
threat. Moreover, preventing data in the cloud from insiders may require new methodologies 
different from those used to protect data stored locally. This chapter discusses insider threat at 
cloud relational databases (cloud RDBMS). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work 
that tackles this problem at cloud RDBMS. As discussed earlier, knowledgebase is a serious 
source for insider threat. Insiders can combine the data items that they accessed (in their 
knowledgebases) with other data items that they can request to infer sensitive information. Cloud 
RDBMS has new vulnerabilities that may enable insiders to breach the existed solutions and 
launch attacks using their knowledgebases. One of these possible vulnerabilities is the migration 
(live migration) of insiders’ tasks across availability zones and data centers due to load 
balancing. This chapter shows how existing insider threat preventing methodologies, which 
prevent insiders from exploiting their knowledgebases to pose threat, can be breached by insiders 
in cloud RDBMS. Moreover, it proposes three models that can be used to prevent the threat of 
knowledgebases in this new environment. Furthermore, it addresses the conditions under which 
they can be used effectively. In addition, it discusses how to manage the effect of updating data 
items in knowledgebases using the proposed models.  
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7.2 Insider Threat in Cloud Relational Databases 
Cloud providers store data in multiple datacenters that are both geographically and logically 
separated. A datacenter consists of connected servers and storage systems. Storage systems are 
aggregated into storage pools to form logical storage, which can be accessed from different 
computer systems that share the storage pool. One of the key benefits of this feature is that data 
can be replicated or moved to other locations (storage locations) transparently to servers using it 
[Stryer12].   
 
Availability zones in each datacenter are connected via inexpensive and low latency network. To 
achieve greater performance and fault tolerance, an application’s traffic may be   distributed   
across multiple availability zones and data centers, which is called elastic load balancing 
[Amazon12a]. Figure 7.1 shows the structure of Amazon cloud services. The figure shows that 
Amazon has five data centers across the globe. Each datacenter has more than one availability 
zone (AZ) [Amazon12b]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Amazon’s Cloud Structure 
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Cloud relational databases are fragmented and replicated to increase availability and reliability. 
Replication of data across availability zones and datacenters should be consistent. Workloads on 
replicas’ nodes are balanced using live migration, where tenants (applications) are migrated from 
overloaded nodes to idle (or low-loaded) nodes to achieve load balancing. Users have no control 
on choosing the location or the instance that they prefer. Cloud systems choose the server, the 
location and the storage that are needed for executing a process depending on some criteria such 
as the amount of load on servers or availability zones. Thus, different user’s requests may be 
executed on different instances in the same availability zone or in different availability zones or 
data centers.  
 
Replication and load balancing increases the performance of cloud relational database systems. 
However, it may increase the probability of insider threat. Such a threat arises when a cloud 
relational database system fails to use the knowledgebase of insiders to detect threat. In other 
words, an insider may combine data items s/he gets from database instances in different 
availability zones to pose threat. Figure 7.2 shows the problem. The insider accesses the data 
item D1 in the availability zone 1(AZ1) (that may have the knowledgebase of the insider) and then 
accesses D2 in the availability zone n (AZn) (that may not have the insider’s knowledgebase). In 
this case, the system on the availability zone n fails to detect this threat and enables the insider to 
access D2. Thus, the insider combines the two data items and gets the sensitive information S1, 
which is a threat.  
 
In addition, insiders are allowed to access a cloud from any site on the globe, which is one of the 
features that the cloud offers. Cloud systems connect insiders to the closest availability zone (if it 
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is not overloaded) to execute their queries in order to achieve the best performance. This means 
that insiders may be connected to different availability zones when they travel and work from 
different sites.  In this case, insiders may be able to launch attacks using the same scenario 
described in Figure 7.2. We should mention here that to the best of our knowledge no research 
has discussed the threat of knowledgebase in cloud environment, and no research has addressed 
how to manage knowledgebases in this new environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In light of the previous discussion, an up-to-date knowledgebase should be available to be 
checked at each insider’s access for all insiders to prevent insider threat.  Furthermore, the 
knowledgebase of an insider should be updated after each access an insider performs. Thus, 
cloud RDBMS needs new methodologies to build, store and synchronize knowledgebases in 
cloud environments since local knowledgebase are no longer suitable.    
 
 
Figure 7.2. Insider Threat in Cloud RDBMS 
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7.3 Mitigating the Threat of insiders’ knowledgebases 
Securing cloud RDBMS against insider threat needs a methodology that monitors the activities 
of insiders in different instances and locations of cloud relational databases. The knowledgebases 
of insiders should be checked and synchronized to achieve this purpose. In traditional RDBMS, 
building, maintaining, and checking knowledgebases are the responsibilities of organizations 
(owners). Nonetheless, when moving to the cloud, these operations are transferred to cloud 
providers (Cloud RDBMS). Keeping these responsibilities for local systems when moving to the 
cloud violates the concept of cloud computing. Moreover, keeping the knowledgebase of an 
insider in local storage needs transferring it with every access by the insider, which is an 
infeasible way due to the network overhead that it poses especially when knowledgebase gets 
large. This section introduces three frameworks to maintain knowledgebases in Cloud RDBMS, 
and demonstrates the features and limitations of each one.   
 
7.3.1 Peer-to-Peer  Model 
In this model, the knowledgebase of each insider is built and stored in all availability zones. At 
each access of an insider to a data item in an availability zone, the knowledgebase of the insider 
in the availability zone is updated. Next, the updates are sent to all other availability zones and 
data centers simultaneously to keep knowledgebases consistent. Transactions are monitored 
locally at each availability zone or database instance. Thus, insider threat monitoring is 
performed locally without a need to communicate with other nodes. Figure 7.3 shows the 
proposed framework, where AZ denotes an availability zone, LB denotes load balancing and 
U(KBs) denotes updating of  knowledgebases. As shown in the figure, an insider sends his/her 
query to a cloud RDBMS. The cloud system sends the query to the closest availability zone. If 
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the availability zone has a high load, the query is transferred to another availability zone. In both 
cases, the insider’s knowledgebase is checked to ensure that there is no threat. Once the query is 
executed, the knowledgebase of the insider is updated and all replicas of the knowledgebase in 
all other availability zones are updated as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A key benefit of this model is that there is no single point of failure. Moreover, transactions and 
threat detection processes are executed fast since all processing are performed within a single 
availability zone and no communications are needed with other zones of the cloud system. 
Furthermore, the processing needed for manipulating knowledgebases are distributed among all 
availability zones, which balances the load on them. The challenge that arises when using this 
model is the profiling of activities (building knowledgebases) for each insider. Local profiling is 
faster in processing transactions, but it imposes synchronization problems. Knowledgebases in 
all database servers should be updated simultaneously. Otherwise, insiders may access different 
data items in different sites (due to load balancing) and combine them using dependencies to 
pose threat as discussed earlier. Keeping knowledgebases updated needs a lot of immediate 
Figure 7.3. Peer-to-Peer Model 
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processing, which is both time and resources consuming, and it causes delays in processing 
transactions. In summary, this model poses high network traffic and delays transaction 
processing especially in case of large number of replicas. Therefore, this approach is suitable 
when the number of instances is small.  
 
To enhance the performance of this model, updating knowledgebases in some availability zones 
can be postponed when the processing load or network traffic is high. In this case, new 
processing requests by insiders should be distributed between up-to-date availability zones only. 
Other availability zones can be updated when traffic is low. This helps in increasing the 
performance of processing transactions and in decreasing the delay that may be caused in case of 
high network traffic.  
 
7.3.2 Centralized Model 
This model uses a coordinator site that builds, stores, and manages the knowledgebases of all 
insiders. Moreover, each insider’s query is sent to the coordinator first. Then, the coordinator 
checks the query against insider threat using the insider’s knowledgebase that it has. If no threat 
exists, the coordinator sends the query to one of the cloud RDBMS nodes (in an availability 
zone) with taking into account the load balancing. After executing the query successfully, the 
cloud RDBMS sends back an acknowledgement to the coordinator so that it can update the 
knowledgebase of the insider. The model in this case has a bottleneck. That is, failure of the 
coordinator turns down the entire system of insider threat prediction and prevention. Figure 7.4 
shows the modified model. The modified model uses a secondary coordinator to mitigate the 
bottleneck problem, which is similar to the idea used in damage recovery in distributed systems 
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by Zue  and Panda [Zue04]. The secondary coordinator is used only in case of failure. However, 
the secondary knowledgebase should be updated to keep both knowledgebases consistent as 
shown in Figure 7.4, where U(KBs) indicates updating the knowledgebases, LB indicates load 
balancing, and “Ackn.” denotes an acknowledgement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The advantages of this model include relatively small amount of network traffic in compared to 
the previous model. Thus, this model is more scalable than Peer-to-Peer model. Moreover, the 
updates are synchronized between the instances of knowledgebases only (the primary and 
secondary sites). That is, no delay occurs because of the synchronizing process between 
knowledgebases instances. However, the delay may happen because all requests are inspected 
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and filtered at the central unit. Therefore, the central unit should be equipped with high 
performance capabilities to carry out this job.  
 
7.3.3 Mobile-Knowledgebases Model 
This model has the advantages of Peer-to-Peer model, and mitigates its disadvantages. In this 
model, an availability zone in a data center stores knowledgebases of insiders who are 
geographically close to it, instead of storing knowledgebases of all insiders. For example, Figure 
7.5 shows how knowledgebases of insiders in the USA may be stored; where Arkansas insiders’ 
knowledgebases can be stored in availability zone 4, and Washington insiders’ knowledgebases 
can be stored in availability zone 1. Hence, availability zones may belong to different data 
centers. This model depends on the assumption that insiders are highly probably performing 
most of their work in one location (i.e. a company complex). However, an insider may perform 
his/her work from different (geographically) locations, which is a key advantage of 
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cloud computing. In this case, the cloud system should send a copy of the knowledgebase of the 
insider to the new location to check his/her queries against insider threat. In the figure, Send KBs 
stands for sending a copy of a knowledgebase of an insider, which may be needed when 
balancing a load or when an insider accesses an availability zone that does not have his/her 
knowledgebase.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To show how the model works, suppose that an insider, say Bob, works for a company in 
Arkansas, which belongs to availability zone 4 (AZ4). Assume that Bob travelled to Washington, 
which belongs to availability zone 1 (AZ1), and he wants to perform some work for his 
company. Figure 7.6 shows how the model works in this case. Bob sends his query to the cloud 
system, which forwards his request to AZ1. The cloud system in this availability zone checks 
whether Bob’s knowledgebase exits or not. Since the knowledgebase is not available, the cloud 
system in AZ1 contacts other availability zones asking for the knowledgebase of Bob. 
Figure 7.6. Executing Queries in a Mobile-Knowledgebases Model 
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Availability zone 4, which has the knowledgebase, sends a copy of Bob’s knowledgebase to 
AZ1. Then, the cloud system in AZ1 checks whether there is a threat posed by Bob. If there is no 
threat, AZ1 executes Bob’s request and sends the updates on Bob’s knowledgebase to AZ4. 
Algorithm 7.1 shows how this model works in details. 
 
 
Algorithm 7.1. Executing Transactions and Insider Threat Prevention in Mobile-
Knowledgebases Model 
Input.  Dependencies, Knowledgebases 
Output. Updated Knowledgebases, Insider Threat Prevention 
 
1. For each insider K 
2.   Store an instance of the knowledgebase of K (KB(K)) in the closest AZ 
3. For each transaction T submitted by an insider F to AZ J 
4.     Check the availability of KB(F) in J 
5.     If KB(F) exists in J 
6.         Retrieve KB(F) and the Dependencies graph DG  
7.         Use KB(F) and DG to detect insider threat 
8.       If an insider threat is detected   
9.           Deny T   
10.       Else 
11.           Execute T 
12.           Update KB(F) in the AZ J  
13.   Else 
14.        Send a “search request” for KB(F) to other availability zones 
15.        Retrieve KB(F) from its host AZ, say HAZ   
16.        Use KB(F) and DG to detect insider threat  
17.        If an insider threat is detected 
18.           Deny T 
19.        Else 
20.            Execute T 
21.            Sends the Updated  KB(F) to HAZ      
 
 
Mobile-Knowledgebases model eliminates the need to store knowledgebases of all insiders in 
every availability zone as in Peer-to-Peer model.  Moreover, it has less traffic than model since 
updates of knowledgebases are sent to host availability zones only in case of “moving” insiders. 
Thus, this model is more scalable than Peer-to-Peer model. Furthermore, a failure of an 
availability zone does not affect the tasks of other insiders in other availability zones, which 
means it does not have a bottleneck as in the Centralized model (more reliable). Furthermore, in 
144 
 
most cases, the model needs to process the transactions and manage the knowledgebases of some 
insiders only, which means it has less processing overhead than other models. 
 
This model can be optimized more in order to eliminate the need to send messages to all 
availability zones searching for the knowledgebase of a “moving insider”. This can be achieved 
by storing a directory for all insiders on an organization and their hosting availability zones. 
Thus, when an insider’s request is sent to an availability zone other than his/her hosting one, the 
cloud system at the new availability zone looks up the directory it has to retrieve the insider’s 
hosting availability zone. Then, a message is sent to the hosting availability zone only to retrieve 
the knowledgebase of the insider. Storing the directory of all insiders needs more storage, but it 
greatly reduces the traffic overhead, especially when the number of availability zones and data 
centers gets larger. 
 
7.4 Managing Dependency Graphs and Updates on Data items in Cloud RDBMS 
Knowledgebases and dependency graphs are major parts in insider threat prediction and 
prevention models as discussed earlier. We suggest using the proposed dependency graphs, 
which are NDIG and CDG, in insider threat mitigation models in cloud RDBMS. In traditional 
insider threat mitigation models (in traditinoal RDBMS), dependency graphs are stored locally as 
a part of the models. In cloud RDBMS, the location of NDIG and CDG depends on which model 
we would adopt to manage knowledgebases. In Peer-to-Peer and Mobile-Knowledgebases 
models,  dependecy graphs should be stored in each availability zone since insider threat 
prediction and prevention is performed at each one.  However, in Centeralized model, 
dependency graphs need to be stored at the coordinater’s sites only.  
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As discussed earlier, checking life times of data items in knowledgebases is crucial. 
Knowledgebase in cloud RDBMS should be managed by taking into account the lifetimes of data 
items such that expired data items are marked or deleted. Managing the lifetimes of data items in 
cloud RDBMS depends on the model used for managing knowledgebases. Two possible ways 
can be used to manage the lifetimes of data items in cloud relational databases (cloud RDB), 
which are Exhaustive-Updating and Updating-on-Use.  
 
7.4.1 Exhaustive-Updating Approach 
In this approach, on each write access of a data item by an insider, all knowledgebases of 
insiders are investigated searching for the data item. If the data item exists in one of to 
knowledgebases, the value of the data item is checked against expiration. If the value is expired, 
the data item is deleted or marked as expired. After completing this process, all instances of 
affected knowledgebases should be updated. Notice that in this approach a threat prediction 
model needs to investigate knowledgebase only to search for a risky data item and to check 
whether its lifetime is expired or not.  
 
Using this approach in Peer-to-Peer model is time consuming, and poses network traffic and 
processing overhead since the Peer-to-Peer model maintains knowledgebases at each availability 
zone. Once a knowledgebase is updated, the updates should be sent through networks to other 
cloud RDBMS nodes. Therefore, this approach can be used in small systems that have small 
number of insiders and data items and when the number of cloud RDB instances is small. In 
Centralized Model, updating knowledgebases when using Exhaustive-Updating approach is 
performed on the coordinators site only. Moreover, network traffic occurs between the primary 
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site and the secondary site only. Thus, less network traffic is posed in comparing to the previous 
model, which means that it is more scalable. However, since all the processing of threat 
prediction and prevention is performed at coordinators site, using this approach adds more load 
to the coordinator’s node, which may overload it. Therefore, powerful capabilities should be 
guaranteed and maintained at the node.  
 
The workload of using this approach in Mobile- Knowledgebases model is distributed among 
availability zones. Clearly, since the knowledgebases of a group of insiders are stored in the 
closest availability zone, updating a knowledgebase is performed locally, and no update is sent 
out through networks. That is, no network overhead is posed as in Peer-to-Peer model, and 
contrarily to the Centralized Model, the processing overhead of maintaining knowledgebases is 
distributed among all availability zones. Thus, the best performance of the Exhaustive-Updating 
approach is achieved when it used with Mobile-Knowledgebases model. 
 
7.4.2 Updating-on-Use Approach: 
Contrary to the Exhaustive-Updating approach, this method does not update knowledgebases 
immediately after each update. Instead, the lifetime of a data item is updated when it is checked 
against insider threat only, which is performed as follows. At each read access to a data item by 
an insider, if the data item can be used with a another data item, say F, in the insider’s 
knowledgebase to pose threat, the timestamp of  F  (in the insider’s knowledgebase) is compared 
to the write timestamp of F in the cloud RDB. If F was updated after the last access to it by the 
insider, F is called P-Expired, which indicates Possibly Expired. Next, the value of F is 
investigated to check whether F is expired or not. If it is expired, the data item is removed from 
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the knowledgebase of the insider or marked as expired. This two-phase checking process 
eliminates the need to check the value of F in case it was not overwritten after the last access by 
the insider. Obviously, this approach reduces the processing overhead needed to investigate the 
entire knowledgebase at each write access. However, it adds more processing time to 
transactions since it needs checking both knowledgebases and cloud RDBMS in order to check 
the lifetimes of data items during transactions processing.  
 
Adopting this approach in Peer-to-Peer model does not pose high network traffic overhead since 
updates to knowledgebases are sent gradually, which greatly less than the overhead that is posed 
when using Exhaustive-Updating approach. However, the processing time needed for 
transactions is greater than that needed in Exhaustive-Updating approach as mentioned earlier. 
Similarly, using this approach in Centralized Model reduces network traffic between the primary 
and secondary coordinators when compared to the Exhaustive-Updating approach, and adds 
more processing time to transactions. In Mobile-Knowledgebases model, no extra network traffic 
is posed as in Exhaustive-Updating approach. However, similar to the other models, more 
processing time is needed for transactions when adopting this approach.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
The dissertation has studied insider threat in relational database systems. It has analyzed the 
factors and capabilities that insiders have and use to launch attacks. These factors include the 
accumulative knowledge that insiders get about data items and the dependencies and constraints 
that they acquire through legal accesses to data items or through collaborating with other 
insiders. The dissertation has classified dependencies into different types, and determined the 
amount and type of knowledge that insiders get based on dependencies. 
 
Modeling the dependencies and constraints among data items facilitates understanding the 
structure of relational database systems. Furthermore, it enables defense systems to predict what 
knowledge an insider can get when accessing a data item. Therefore, we have developed two 
types of dependency graphs, which are Neural and Dependency Graph (NDIG) and Constraints 
and Dependencies Graph (CDG). NDIG demonstrates the dependencies among data items. 
Moreover, it shows the amount of information an insider can get about a data item when s/he 
accesses another data item or a group of data items. In comparison, CDG shows both the 
dependencies and constraints among data items. It tells what values of data items are stored in 
insiders’ knowledgebases. In addition to dependencies and constraints, the dissertation has 
shown how knowledgebases play a major role in posing insider threat. To represent 
knowledgebases, the dissertation developed new knowledge graphs (KGs) that show the data 
items that insiders have accessed as well as the amount of information they have about data 
items. In addition, knowledge graphs demonstrate the data items about which insiders can infer 
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information. We have used knowledge graphs and dependency graphs to predict what knowledge 
(authorized or unauthorized) an insider may get if s/he accesses a data item. We have used a new 
graph called Threat Prediction Graph (TPG) that uses NDIG, CDG and KG to predict and 
prevent unauthorized knowledge. A threat alert is raised when an insider gets more information 
than allowed (based on a threshold value) about a data item. The dissertation has stated 
algorithms, theorems, proofs and simulations to prove the effectiveness of the proposed models 
in preventing unauthorized knowledge acquisition by insiders. The simulations have shown the 
effectiveness of the proposed models in preventing unauthorized knowledge without affecting 
the availability of data items. As shown by simulations, the percentage of prevented threat 
(without denying read accesses) increases as the number of transactions and the percentage of 
write operations in transactions increase, and it reaches about 30% when the percentage of write 
operations in transactions is 0.80 (when the number of transactions is 250). 
 
Unauthorized modifications of sensitive data items are another aspect of insider threat. The 
dissertation has investigated this problem and addressed the paths insiders use to launch such 
attacks. It has developed new graphs called Modification Graphs and Dependency Graphs that 
show what data items an insider can change using legal write accesses or dependencies, and how 
to predict insider threat. Furthermore, we have proposed approaches to prevent such threats by 
hiding sensitive dependencies or denying some write access requests. In addition, we have stated 
the conditions under which those solutions are best used. That is, we have shown that in some 
cases allowing unauthorized modifications is better than hiding sensitive dependencies or 
denying write requests, especially when the cost of affecting availability is greater than the cost 
of exposing some sensitive information. Moreover, the dissertation has demonstrated when to 
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allow unauthorized modifications and when to prevent them based on the weight of sensitivity 
and availability values of data items. Algorithms, theorems, proofs and simulations have been 
provided to show the correctness and the effectiveness of the proposed approaches. The 
simulation has shown that the proposed approaches work better when the percentage of write 
operations in transactions gets larger.  
 
The dissertation has addressed the importance of organizing accesses to data items in concurrent 
tasks. It has shown how organizing accesses to data items can prevent insider threats without 
affecting the availability of data items. We have shown how to compute the risk value of each 
possible sequence of executing tasks operations. Based on the risk values, a safe sequence is 
chosen and the operations of tasks are executed in the selected order. The dissertation has shown 
how to select a safe sequence in both declared and undeclared tasks. However, if no safe 
sequences are found, risky transactions are rejected. The effectiveness of the proposed 
approaches was tested using simulations. In declared tasks, the simulations have shown the 
percentage of prevented threat using safe sequences in comparison to all prevented threats. As 
reported by simulations, the probability of finding a safe sequence increases as the number of 
concurrent insiders and the percentage of write operations in transactions gets larger. The 
simulations have addressed that the percentage of prevented threats using safe sequences reaches 
about 65% when the number of concurrent insiders is 25 and the percentage of write operations 
equals to 50%. Moreover, the percentage of prevented threats using safe sequences reaches about 
40% when the percentage of operations is 80% and the number of concurrent insiders is 10. 
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Security concerns are the major issues when moving data to the cloud. One of these concerns is 
the vulnerabilities that may be exploited by insiders to launch attacks. The dissertation has 
discussed insider threat in cloud relational databases. It has shown how balancing workload 
across availability zones and data centers may enable insiders to breach traditional insider threat 
prevention models. To prevent such threats, the dissertation has demonstrated new insider threat 
prediction and prevention models that are suitable for the cloud environment, which are Peer-to-
Peer model, Centralized model and Mobile-Knowledgebases model. It  has shown how 
knowledgebases, updates on data items and dependency graphs can be managed, synchronized 
and used effectively to defend cloud RDBMS against insider threat. Furthermore, it has 
addressed the conditions under which the models can work with highest performance, and has 
presented the advantages and disadvantages of each model on processing time, network traffic 
and overall cloud RDBMS performance.  
 
8.2 Future Work  
Defending cloud RDBMS against insider threat still needs more research. We plan to conduct 
research on organizing the operations of concurrent tasks in the cloud environment similar to 
what we have done for traditional relational databases. Moreover, we plan to conduct 
experiments to establish the effectiveness of the proposed models in managing knowledgebases 
in cloud RDBMS, and measure and compare the overhead (processing time and network traffic) 
that the models can add to the cloud RDBMS.   
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